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PREFACE

Thank you for waiting so patiently. The five-stone to two-stone portion of Kage's guaranteed winning methods for handicap go is complete.

I have placed the emphasis on pro vs. pro handicap games, in which I had the unstinting cooperation of Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan, my close friend for thirty years. I would like to let the actual game records explain, 'Here is how to win when you have a handicap.' From the post-game commentaries and discussions, I feel certain that you will be able to grasp the essential character of go.

Find-the-next-move-type problems accompany the game records, and seeing how many points you can get should add to the interest. It will also be interesting to see if White manages to win any of these handicap games. When you finish this book and nod in understanding, your playing strength will have taken a great stride forward.

June, 1974 Toshiro Kageyama

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INTRODUCTION

Try playing another amateur and changing the handicap after every game. Even against an equally strong opponent, you may sometimes be driven up to four or five stones, and the reverse is just as possible. It is no exaggeration to say that such a thing could absolutely never happen among professionals.

Amateurs' playing strengths are so unstable that even a slight shift in mood can affect them considerably. To stabilize that instability, you must make people regard you as strong at handicap go. If you are needlessly afraid of stronger players, that fear will paralyze your hand and deaden your game. I have good news, however, for those many of you who tend to yield to the stronger player's moves and give in the instant he tries anything rough. Read this book thoroughly, and say farewell to those days of submission.

First, let me introduce Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan, the other professional who appears in these pages. He was born in 1919 in Tokyo, but settled in Shizuoka after the war. He is old enough to have gained experience, but as the years go by, his game keeps the youthful vigor, breeziness, and reliance on sheer violence that have earned him the nickname 'The Bully'. He is a close friend of mine, and my senior; we are both pupils of Yasunaga.

Kageyama: 'I'll have to show some good examples in this book on how to win at handicap go, and I'm afraid that if I make them up myself, it'll become an exercise in self-gratification. They'll seem too artificial—not alive, like real games—so I've been thinking of asking for your help and trying some pro-pro handicap go, mixing conversations and verbal clashes in with the games to get some living examples.'

Yokoyama: 'I see. There are pro-pro handicap go books already, but they seem a little far removed from the amateur level, don't they—the meijin against some nine dan at eight stones—the gods at play. Now if you and I played, the amateurs could feel more kinship.'

Kageyama: 'As long as the games are real, you can't be sure that one of us won't lose with a three, or even four-stone handicap, so the competition will be interesting. And we should keep the conversations in our usual style, without holding our fangs in.'

Yokoyama: 'Who holds his fangs in? I always show my teeth when I talk.'

Kageyama: 'Well, there's not the slightest bit of restraint between us, so I'm expecting a few biting comments. If the readers can get something out of that kind of conversation between professionals, it should help them to improve, which is my main purpose.'

Yokoyama: 'All right, let's make this an interesting book, the kind that people will open and just naturally start reading in the bookstores.'

Kageyama: 'Anything for the sake of the go fans, even if they all read it in the bookstores without buying it.'

Yokoyama: 'Well then, here's to success.'

FIVE STONE GAMES

All handicap games start from the handicap points, and it is common knowledge that the purpose of playing on the handicap points is not to take territory. Rather, the stress is on building up influence and playing a fast, fighting game. I want you to realize that this is the true meaning of handicap go, or rather of the handicap stones.

In this game the player who takes the more territory—even just one point more—wins, so I can understand the desire to amass territory quickly and defend it firmly to the end, but please be aware that this strategy completely contradicts the spirit of the handicap stones.

Let that be the first message in Kage's Secret Chronicles of Handicap Go.

FIRST FIVE-STONE GAME

White: Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan
Black: Toshiro Kageyama, 6-dan



Figure 1 (1—2)

Figure 1. *The approach to handicap go.*

What does a player think about in the opening of a game, handicap or even? A surprisingly large number of amateurs think of building territory right from the beginning. Especially when they have to put as many as five stones against a stronger player, all they think about is taking territory and holding on to their territorial lead from the first stone to the last. Until they correct that idea, they cannot hope to get much stronger.

In this game I answered White 1 aggressively with 2, showing my willingness to get in and challenge White right from the start.



Figure 2 (1—11)

Figure 2. *Which side to block on.*

White 3 to 11 are a joseki. At Black 4 in this sequence, if Black blocks from the side of 1 in Dia. 1, then after Black 5, White gets to take an ideal point at 6 and Black's plays become a bit ineffective. Black 4 in the figure was, therefore, correct.



Dia. 1

Problem: Where would you play Black 12? Confining yourself to *A*, *B*, and *C*, which would you choose?



Figure 3 (1)

Figure 3. *San-ren-sei.*

Black 1, making a san-ren-sei, is correct. The idea is to enlarge the area in which you have a strong superiority. The handicap point on the lower side would also make a san-ren-sei, but Black 1 is better. One has the feeling that it is the only move.

Black *A* and *B* are too biased in one direction.

Yokoyama: 'I guess the reason that everybody wants to play *A* or *B* is that they're afraid of having White △ set in motion. If Black plays 1, White can jump out to *p*, for example.'

Kageyama: 'Yes. Now that Black has made that wall, he wants to keep White from turning around and attacking it. I think we'd better take the trouble to explain this.'

Yokoyama: 'I have a good example from one of my teaching games.



Dia. 2

'In Dia. 2, Black answered my White 1 by pushing out with 2 and 4, so I went after his wall with 5 to 9, then got a good chance to invade two points to the right of Black △. His opening really fell apart.'

Kageyama: 'That looks like your high-and-mighty style, all right, but once you got to this point, you certainly had a good thing going. Basically, however, I think White 1 is a doubtful move. I mean, if Black plays 2 to 10 in Dia. 3, his forces are all solidly tied together and you have five stones with no base and no eyes. You've just given him a target to attack. White 1 in Dia. 4, followed by 2 to 10, comes out pretty much the same.'



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Figure 4 (1–15)

Figure 4. *Key contact play.*

If White did not play 1 and let me build myself up with something like 3, it would be hard for him to find a move. As for Black 2, the sequence in Dia. 5 is also possible, but the idea behind Black 2 was to finish quickly, take sente, and make another san-rensei on the lower side.



Dia. 5

Kageyama: 'That diagonal contact play at 8 is one of my key plays for winning handicap go.'

Problem: Black 16: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A



B

A (100%): Black 1 is such a key point that it must be played. After the moves from 2 to 5, this should be very clear.

B (60%): The thinking behind this move is understandable, but Black has to feel uncomfortable when White cuts at 2.

Black 3 to 11 are his strongest counterplays, and there are probably those who think that Black is doing well to have captured two stones. Black, however, has made essentially no attack on White.

C (60%): This turns out about the same as *B*, so we shall forego a diagram.



Figure 5 (1-14)

Figure 5. *Attack and defense.*

Yokoyama: 'With White 2, I was looking for some way to handle the attack.'

Kageyama: 'I didn't play Black 5 with the blind intention of cutting, but let's just see what happens if I do cut. That's Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 6 on the next page. After White 4 to 16, I've got things to worry about in the upper right corner, and even with Black 17, those white stones in the lower right corner aren't definitely captured, so it's not very satisfactory.'

Even though Black 7 let White connect at 8, Black 9 kept the attack going without let-up.

If I had played Black 11 to the left of 4, I could have captured the two white stones, but White would have had the hane at 11 with which to make two eyes and I would have had nothing to aim at. Black 11 was unavoidable.

Yokoyama: 'Was there some danger if I didn't play 12?'

He is testing me.

Kageyama: 'Black 1 in Dia. 7 would have just about finished you off. Do I have to explain everything as I play along? That's asking too much.'



Dia. 6

⑫ *connects*



Dia. 7

As Yokoyama knew perfectly well, Black 1 in Dia. 7 leads to the sequence up to 7. White is not dead, but he is not far from it. Black can win territory and gain influence while torturing the white group, and White's position is clearly hopeless. There was no avoiding White 12 and 14.

Problem: Where should Black play 15?



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

❾ *captures*

Dia. 8. If Black plays in the lower left corner, then since White has become strong in the upper right, the jump out to 1 has become a powerful move. Whereas it would have been pointless before, (Dia. 3), the surroundings have changed and now the sequence up to 11 is starting to look promising for White. Black's whole group is unstable, and White △ is in a good spot.

Dia. 9. So Black 1 is correct. If White responds with 2 and so on, Black need not bat an eyelash. The sequence up to 11 is simple and good. If Black wants to fight it out, however, then instead of 5. . . .

Dia. 10. He can play 1 to 9. He should not start this operation unless he can read it out to the end, but by investing a little money in the left side, he can capture the four white stones on the upper side. Yokoyama pointed out this strong way to play.



Dia. 10



Figure 6 (1-2)

Figure 6. *Timing.*

Black 1 had been unnecessary at the very beginning of the game, but now the situation had changed, and it had become more urgent. This kind of thing is extremely common in go. The same move may be good at one time and bad at another. Always keep this in mind.

Black *p* on the left side would not necessarily have been bad, however.

Yokoyama: 'Well, here's my chance to play at the three-three point. What's Kage going to do?'

Problem: With 3, should Black answer at *A*, *B*, or *C*? Which do you think is correct?



Figure 7 (1-7)

Figure 7. *How to choose.*

A, (Black 1), was correct. The reason is that even if Black cuts White off, he has no attack on the big white group. If White's stones had a little less eye shape, then *B*, (Black 1 at 2), solidly blocking the linkage, would be correct. The strength or weakness of White's big group is the basis for Black's choice of moves.

Black 1, however, is almost too much a handicap-go move. During the game I wondered if I should not play *C*, (Black 1 at 4). But if I started to think about what was a handicap-go move and what was an even-game move, I could never play honestly. Black 1 was unarguably correct.



Figure 8 (1-21)

Figure 8. *That key contact play.*

For the second or third time White was invading my area, and I was all ready for him with the key contact play at 2. The location was different, but the action was the same. I am not sure which of us was being stubborn.

Yokoyama: 'Look, Kage, let's not overdo the repitition.'

Kageyama: 'You're the one who keeps playing the same old move. Cut it out.'

Up to White 15 we went over exactly the same ground as in the lower right corner, but I had a plan. This time the cut worked. I banged Black 16 down onto the board. 'Hey!' said Yoko. If he played 21 at *p*, I could handle him with *q*.



Figure 9 (1-13)

Figure 9. *Double attack.*

Black 1, 3, and 5 were a heart-rejoicing combination, but actually 3 at *p* would have been better. White would cut at 5, but I could have handled it in the usual way by playing a hane underneath and linking up. The exchange of 3 for 4 made things easier for White, but still. . . .

White 6 and 8 were typical of Yokoyama's arrogant style. Those of us who live by common sense would never be guilty of such behavior.

Black 7 and 11 were perfect double-attacking moves, but Yokoyama looked not the slightest bit afraid. Quite the contrary, he gazed about owl-like, hunting for cracks in my position to pry into, and jumped out to 12.



Figure 10 (1-16)

Figure 10. *Temper, temper.*

Black 1, which put a gun to White's head, was actually a way of indirectly holding him back from a push-through and cut that would have started with 4.

Yokoyama: 'What a mess we're getting into. What about this 4 and 6?'

Kageyama: 'Your natural bad temper is showing through.'

With that Yoko really did lose his temper and forced his way through the sequence from 4 to 16. Could these moves have been anything but madness?

Problem: For Black 17, which is correct: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A and B



C

A (80%): Black *A* would be a lax move. It would be safe and secure, but would have no rhythm or flow.

B (70%): What about attacking at *B*? White can make shape with *p*, and if Black is clumsy about it, there is the danger of a counterattack from White *A*.

C (100%): First take profit while attacking with 1, wait for White to run out with 2, and then run out yourself with 3. That is the rhythm. You should learn this way of making the stones flow.



Figure 11 (1–10)

Figure 11. *White links up.*

Kageyama: 'Black 1 and 3 look a little soft-hearted. Isn't there some way actually to capture you?'

Yokoyama: 'You're giving me the willies. Stop babbling, or I'll sweep you off the board.'

White 6 was a good move. White's shape was a little bent, but he was linked up. Black's splitting play at *p* was just potential; it could not be used to cut at present.

Turning to the tesuji at 7, I was aiming at *q* and casting sidelong glances at the whole white group, but instead of 7, Black *r* in the lower left corner would have shown more composure.

With 8 and 10 White was trying to play the maximum forcing moves. He was also holding Black *s* in check.

Yokoyama: 'Maybe I should have drawn back one point to the right of 8 instead of playing 10.'



Figure 12 (1-10)

Figure 12. *Wrapping it up.*

Yokoyama: 'White 4 was too early. After all, I had a forcing play at *p*, and I should have left myself the possibility of cutting at 5.'

White 6 and 8 were perhaps uncalled for.

The exchange of 9 for 10 had the drawback that it took White out of all danger, but the time had come to wrap up the victory.

What I want everyone to appreciate is the unremitting way in which Black fought against White throughout the game. Almost never did I make a move purely to take territory. The territory came naturally as I kept threatening to capture White, or at least that is the impression one gets. Now the game was overwhelmingly in my favor.



Figure 13 (1-4)

Figure 13. *Calculating the end.*

Black 1 locked up the upper right corner. Without this play there would be some danger from a white peep one line below 1.

With this the stage had been reached where we can begin to count Black's territory. Combining Black's upper right and lower side, we get fifty points. Considering what White may make in the upper left, he has twenty odd points. As we entered the endgame, it would be fair to say that White was completely out of the picture.

White 2 and 4 on the left side caused the final scuffle. Ignoring victory and defeat, White was just trying to catch up, even if only by a little.

Problem: For Black 5, which would you play: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A



B

A (80%): There are probably many who think that this must be the right time to cut White off with 1. After letting him live in the corner up to 6, Black can nab four stones with 7. Could there be anything wrong with this? Yes, there could. Viewing the lower left quadrant as a whole, White has been allowed to get away too easily.

B (100%): Can you see why Black 1, defending the corner and left side, is better than the previous diagram? After Black 7, White has to make another move. If he does not, Black *a*, White *b*, Black *c*, and White is dead.

Comparing *A* and *B*, *B* turns out to be better by about 10 points.

C (80%): See the next page.



Figure 14 (1-16)

⑯ *takes ko*

Figure 14. *Ko threats.*

Black 1 was a little greedy. As already explained, 1 at 2 was correct.

Yokoyama handled himself very cleverly in the sequence from 2 to 12. White 4 and 6 were especially good moves. He had now linked up his four stones and was planning to live in ko in the corner. This means that Black 1 was unsound.

So there was a ko, and I had to be careful because ko threats like *p* and *q* would not be answered. After all, if White won the ko, he could link up along the lower edge.

My ko threat, therefore, had to be on the upper side. *A? B?* Which do you think?



Figure 15 (1-7)

Figure 15. *A trade.*

The shoulder attack at Black 1 was very sharply aimed. White could not stop to answer it. The ko looked like being worth thirty points.

I got to make my two moves at 1 and 3 on the upper side; how did I do on this trade? Against White 4, Black 5, aiming at White's shortage of liberties, was a well-read-out play, and if White had connected either at 7 or two points below there, it would have been bad for him. So White fled away with 6; better this than total destruction. After Black 7,

Kageyama: 'I guess I lost out on this trade.'

Yokoyama: 'Looks like I didn't get as much profit as I wanted. You've gotten too strong on the upper side.'



Figure 16 (1-8)

Figure 16. *Attacking aggressively.*

With 5 White had made his escape, while I had made profit and thickness with 2 and 4, a more or less reasonable result. Most important, however, was that I came away with sente and got to play 6 and 8 in the lower left to set my mind at ease about the big group there.

Yokoyama: 'Nuts to Black 6. Looks like I've lost by forty points.'

Kageyama: 'No, more like fifty points.'

When we played it out to the end, I won by forty-seven points. By attacking aggressively throughout the game, I had earned a one-sided victory, but it is interesting to see how in a pro-pro game, even at five stones, White does not give in so easily.

Subsequent moves omitted. Black wins by 47 points.

SECOND FIVE-STONE GAME

White: Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan
Black: Toshiro Kageyama, 6-dan



Figure 1 (1–7)

Figure 1. *The Kageyama school.*

Kageyama: 'This time I changed my style completely. I played 2, 4, and 6 deliberately to build up a solid opening.'

Yokoyama: 'That didn't put any pressure on me, but I guess I understood your strategy. You were trying to win without taking any chances.'

White 7 is a common extension in handicap go; you should be aware that it is something of an overplay. Most amateurs, facing strong four or five-dan opponents, tend to answer it with a counter-extension to *p*, and think that is enough, but such slack moves are strictly forbidden at the Kageyama school.



Figure 2 (1–9)

Figure 2. *Invasion.*

I feel that the invasion at 1 is the only good move. An invasion would also be possible at *B*, but that would let White link underneath at *p* and put less pressure on him than 1. Yokoyama sought complications with 2, but I answered him by the book, attaching at 3 and extending to 5, with my eye, of course, on White △.

Kageyama: 'White 8 was a pretty solid move.'

Yokoyama: 'If I omitted 8, you could attack immediately at *q* and I'd be in trouble. White 8 at *r* is the joseki, but with Black △ placed low in the upper right corner, White *r* doesn't look very attractive. If Black △ were at *s*, I'd play 8 at *r*. Anyway, let's see if our readers can guess whether my next move is going to be *A*, *B*, or *C*.'



A



C



B

A (50%): To run away with 1 just because White △ is in danger shows shallow thinking. After Black 2 to 6, White is in all too apparent difficulties.

C (70%): White 1 favors △ and tries to get it squared away, but Black 2 is severe. Although White can avoid being shut in with the tesuji at 3, Black gets to stretch out in comfort with 6 and 8.

B (100%): White 1, sacrificing △ and gaining outer influence in return, is a good move here. You should know this technique. Black 4 is the key point in this shape,



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

and must not be missed. Instead of 4,

Dia 1. The hane at 1 looks natural, but White takes the key point for both sides with 2. Even if Black resists strongly with 3 and 5, the second hane at 6 gives White a good development. This is important, so let's go into a little more detail.

Dia. 2. The reason you might react at *a* if White pushed you back down at 2 after you had pushed up at 1 is that you are thinking that if White cuts at *b*, you can get a good result with Black *c*, White *d*, and Black *e*. This is true, but you are failing to notice that White can switch directions on you with 2 in Dia. 1.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 3. At first glance Black 1 here looks like good shape, but once again White takes the key point at 2, and Black suffers a loss. Even though he resists with 3 and 5, he ends up being forced.

Dia. 4. The cut at 1 looks like another strong move, but White 2 remains the key point. After Black 3 and 5, White can make shape with 6. The sequence from Black 7 to White 12 is then almost inevitable, and since the center handicap stone joins in the fighting, Black is not doing badly. With 12, however, White is safe, too, and he has some potential at *a* in the upper left corner which should make Black feel uneasy.



Figure 3 (1-15)

Figure 3. *The key point.*

Black 4 was, therefore, a point that I could not let White take. There was a difference of opinion about the rest of this figure, perhaps caused by a difference in styles.

Yokoyama: 'Thanks for playing Black 6; I was afraid that you were going to play 7. Black 6 let me force you with 9 and 11, so I was satisfied.'

Kageyama: 'I'm a stylist—I'd drop dead before I'd make such bad shape as to play Black 6 at 7.'

Yokoyama: 'I thought you might play 14 at 15, too. I would have liked that less.'

Kageyama: 'What are you talking about? Black 14 was the one and only move. After I made the upper right corner nice and secure, I had a beautiful extension all the way to *p* on the upper side.'

Problem: Is Black's next move at *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A

A (50%): Black 1 is completely uninteresting. The white group in the upper right corner is already stable, so it does not make sense to attack it.

B (100%): Black 1 is excellent. If White goes into the three-three point, Black can set his sights on the outside. The sequence up to 19 is very good for him. Black 19 is a move that Yokoyama recommended.

C (100%): Black 1 is steady and reliable. Its intent is different from the previous diagram, but it, too, is an excellent move.



B



C



Figure 4 (1–10)

Figure 4. *A good opening.*

Kageyama: 'A two-space extension, White 2 at *p*, looks like the ordinary move to me.'

Yokoyama: 'I don't like it. If I play 2 at *p*, you'll block me two points to the left, and my group will look heavy. The idea behind White 2 is to make a light shape.'

At any rate, now came the long-awaited extension and blocking move at 3, and once I got that point, I had a good opening.

Yokoyama: 'It appears that I could have ignored the upper side instead of playing 4. You got some profit in sente in the sequence from 4 to 10.'

Problem: Next I turned my attention to the lower left. Is *A*, *B*, or *C* the correct move?

A



B



C



A (60%): Black 1 is purely defensive, therefore bad.

B (100%): This extension is the right answer. It is not just concerned with the lower side, it is a ladder-breaking move aiming at the cut at *p*.

C (80%): This Black 1 also pressures the white group to the right. Still, White can slide around it with 2.



Figure 5 (1-8)

Figure 5. *The heavens smile.*

White 2 and 4 showed that my opponent knew what I was up to.

Dia. 5. For beginners' reference, this diagram shows that the cut at Black 1 no longer works.



Dia. 5

Black 1 in the figure was not very good shape in itself, but since it aimed at both the cut at *p* and the invasion on the lower side, it was quite powerful. Now the heavens were smiling on me. My invasion at 5 hit the board with a ringing sound. For Black 9, would you pick *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A



B



C

A (80%): Black 1 is the natural next move in the sequence, but here it is a little slack. White makes shape with 2. Black can push through the cracks in White's position with 3 and 5, but White gives up the lower side and comes piling into the right side at 12 in return.

B (100%): Black 1 is a move which cannot be played without first carefully studying the surrounding positions, but here it is powerful. That is, White has 4 to 6, but Black can answer with 7 and 9. With the stone marked △ on the board, if White uses 10 to extend to the left from 6, Black can block to the left of that and win the fight hands down. If White plays 10 in the diagram, Black can give him a bad position with 11.

C (70%): Black 1 is another slack move. It is not good for Black to be pressed in by White 2 and 4.



Figure 6 (1-9)

Figure 6. *A mighty hane.*

To link up with Black 1 at 5 etc. would have been very slack. Black 1 was a mighty hane.

Yokoyama: 'Meeting you head-on with White 2 was questionable. I should have played White 8 right away, or better yet, have turned down at 3.'

Because of White 2, the sequence up to 7, which had been just what I had in mind, appeared before my eyes. It was hard to understand what my opponent was doing here.

Kageyama: 'What're you doing, Yoko?'

Yokoyama: 'I lapsed for a moment. Anyway, this next stone should restore my reputation a bit. Let's see if our readers can guess another of my moves.'

Problem: White's next move: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A (80%): If Black answers White 1 at 2, White ca carry on with 3 and get a fine result. Black, however is more likely to play 2 at 4. Then White will play 2, bu if that is the case. . . .

B (100%): White should start with the attachment at 1. If Black answers at 2, White can bend over the head of the black stone with 3. That makes *B* the right answer.

C (50%): Ridiculous. This is no way to play go.



Figure 7 (1-14)

Figure 7. *Get rid of the threat.*

If I had played 2 at *p*, White would have cross-cut at 3, and I would have been fighting with the constant threat of White *q* in my rear. In this kind of situation, the best thing to do is to get rid of the threat once and for all.

Black 2 did that. With 3 my position on the right side looked very bad, but I ignored it and went my own way. If I could trade △ for the six white stones, I would have the better end of the bargain. To think that Black must try to save △ and White must try to capture it is to think in too greedy terms. Everyone knows that only too well, but if most people were sitting at the go board, all they would see would be Black △. Their own stones look so dear to them that they cannot bear to let them go.

This may be human nature, but if you save your own stones first, you have to postpone attacking you opponent's stones. That cannot be allowed. Please count to see which group of stones is bigger before you decide whether to attack or defend.

Kageyama: 'I was expecting you to play 5 at *r* and make sure of the right side. White 5 was a little impertinent. I went and carelessly played the hane at 6, but suppose I had cut instead; then what would you have done?'



Dia. 6

Yokoyama: 'Cut, would you? That's exactly what I was hoping for. Take a look at White 2 to 4 in Dia. 6. How's that? I'm in great shape. You're lucky; most of the moves you go and carelessly play are good ones. It's disgusting.'

Yoko had looked as if he hadn't been reading, but he had the sequence all figured out. He's a pro, after all.

The way White defended his shape with 9 after the 7–8 exchange deserves approval. The following two moves, 11 and 13, were fully worthy of Yoko's reputation for being a bully. With my connection at 14, White was getting nowhere.

Yokoyama: 'Here's another problem for our readers. Let them think over which is best for White's next move, *A*, *B*, or *C*.'

Kageyama: 'It was the fall of 1943 when I first got to know you. I was all of seventeen years old.'

Yokoyama: 'You have a long memory.'

Kageyama: 'The first game I played against you, you told me to take four stones, which irked me, even though I was only a kid. After all, I didn't have to take a handicap from anybody at the Shimbashi go club. I thought I had you pretty well beaten by the endgame, but I'll never forget that lower left corner.



Ref. Dia. 1



Ref. Dia. 2

Ref. Dia. 1. 'That Black group looked so solid, I was shocked when you came in at 1. I managed to capture you with Black 12 and 14, as far as that went, but it took a lot of moves in that five-space eye to get you off the board, so I was squeezed tight around the outside and lost the game. That really got me, at the time.'

Yokoyama: 'Haha, that's right. I remember, too. Instead of Black 12, you could have captured the white stones much more easily with Black 1, White 2, and Black 3 in reference diagram 2, but you didn't know that. Still, you were really weak back then. I didn't feel I could lose to you at four stones, and your game wasn't improving, either.'

A



A (100%): With 1, White is doing well.

B



B (50%): If White plays here, Black can stop him short with 2. White 1 would have to be called a simple-minded move.

C



C (50%): This White 1 is too early. Black 2 and 4 give White a bad result.

The enemy's key point is your own, and Black 4 is the key point for both sides.



Figure 8 (1-7)

Figure 8. *Impetuous, bad move.*

Yoko was starting to grumble.

Yokoyama: 'White 1 was a bad move, an impetuous move. I had to leave this cut unplayed, as something to aim at, and take the point 4. I was overestimating the value of the atari at 5, if you want to know the truth. To have to make a move like 7 really hurt.'

Yoko had an honest look in his eye, so these grumblings of his can be taken as sincere. It was starting to appear as if I was going to win this game, too, by a wide margin. It would not have done to let up now that I had a chance to decide the issue with one stone. Yoko must have been able to see what was coming on the right side.

Problem: Where should Black play next: *A, B,* or *C*?



B



C

B (70%): When Black plays 1, he has seen that if White answers at 3, he can descend to 2 and be in control, but White will not give him the chance. White will give atari from underneath with 2 and continue with 4, which is not what Black expected.

C (80%): This can be a devastating move when the surrounding positions are strong enough, but here White has the double hane at 6, which practically forces the sequence up to 15. The result is unsatisfactory for Black.

A (100%): The shoulder attack at 1 is more flexible. If White replies at 2, Black can play 3, and then answer 4 by giving atari with 5 and 7. Or if White plays 2 at 4, Black can of course push down at 2. Either way is good for him.



A



Figure 9 (1-6)

Figure 9. *Taken aback.*

Yokoyama: 'I was expecting Black 1, but now that I see it on the board, I'm taken aback by how strong it is.'

Kageyama: 'Wasn't White 6 a mistake?'

Yokoyama: 'Yes, it was. I had to follow the sequence in the explanation on the next page.'

Yoko was grumbling more and more, and not without reason. I had taken territory on the left side, all across the lower side, and on the upper side, and on top of that, I could cut at *p* in the center. Where, one wants to ask, was my opponent's territory? This was not just a wide margin, it was a huge, vast margin, and in addition the right side was coming into question.

Problem: Which is better for Black's next move: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A



B



C

A (70%): Black 1 is a fairly valuable move, worth more than ten points, but White can play 2, 4, and 6, and Black cannot be satisfied.

B (100%): This Black 1 is best. If White defends his shape at 4, he is vulnerable to Black 5 etc., but if he defends his lower group, Black will hit him at 4.

C (70%): This stops the hane, (White *a*), and connection, but not White 2, which is pretty much the same thing. Just as in *A*, White has no trouble settling himself on both sides, and Black cannot be satisfied.



Figure 10 (1-4)

Figure 10. *The benefit of attacking.*

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 and 3 were too much to allow. I had to play the hane and connection myself, instead of 6 in the previous figure.'

Kageyama: 'That's right. I'm starting to feel sorry for you. Considering that I never asked for any territory, it's surprising how much I've gotten. That's one of the benefits of attacking.'

Before taking the point *p* in the upper right, it would be fun to jostle the white group in the center a bit. This had been a thoroughly enjoyable game for me.

Problem: Black would like to test White's reaction in the center. Should he play *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A (100%): Black 1 takes the key point, and suddenly White is in trouble.

B (50%): White answers at 2—this is still the key point—and has no trouble managing his group.

C (50%): Black 1 captures a stone, but White 2 makes that meaningless.



Figure 11 (1-10)

Figure 11. *Toward a simultaneous attack.*

Black 1 was the key point. Yokoyama answered with 2 to 6, but he still was not definitely alive, and Black 3 reached out to reinforce the black group on the right side, setting the stage for the attack at 7. If given the chance, I was ready to mount a simultaneous attack on the center white group and the one in the upper right. I could not help joking a little.

Kageyama: 'I feel as if I'm looking around at a bargain sale and finding so much that I don't know what to take first.'

Yokoyama: '. . .'

For once Yoko was lost for words.

Problem: Where would you play Black 11: at *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A

A (70%): To play 1 is to have been forced. White pushes out to 6 and puts himself in trim. Black △, the stone so carefully played at the key point, becomes ineffective.



B

B (100%): Black 1 and 3 look unimaginative, but they keep White from escaping to the outside. This is the thick way for Black to play. If White plays *a*, he does so in gote. If he does not play *a*, Black can play there in sente, which is no small advantage.

'But that doesn't capture White,' you may complain. Indeed it does not. In a game between professionals, even with a large handicap, you cannot expect to capture groups like this.



C

C (70%): If Black cuts with 1, White will again push out at 2, and answer Black 3 by pressing at 4. Even a biased judge could not award Black any laurels for this performance.



Figure 12 (1-14)

Figure 12. *Another mistake.*

I began with Black 1, anticipating the sequence in *B* on the previous page, but Yoko, who had gotten on edge, made another mistake, with White 2. Because of it, I was able to omit Black *p*. He was probably afraid that if he played 2 at 6 I would play Black 8, White 7, Black *q*.

Now I embarked on one last profit-making venture. I peeped at 13, and Yokoyama naturally connected at 14.

Problem: Which next move would bring Black the most profit: *A*, *B*, or *C*? How should you approach this problem, which may be a bit difficult.



B



A

B (60%): With 1 Black seems to be trying to save the forcing stone ⓐ. White will connect at 2 and risk everything on being able to save his group on the upper side. Whether Black can get anything this way or not is doubtful.

A (70%): This connection looks preferable, but White will connect at 2 again, and Black will be faced with the same problem as in the previous diagram.



C

C (100%): The cut at 1 in the center is therefore the correct answer. Observe the way Black is coldly stashing away sure profit while slowly taking aim at the white group.



Figure 13 (1-17)

Figure 13. *A rich man . . .*

The spirit was all gone out of White. He could have fought back with 2 at 3, although that move did not really look very promising.

White 2 silenced the threat of Black *p*, but it let me surround territory with 3, and the margin grew wider. After this I tried nothing more, and let my opponent have his way in the endgame; a rich man should not pick quarrels. In spite of that, I won by 64 points.

I could boast of an overwhelming superiority from first to last in this game. My opponent helped me out with a few impetuous mistakes, but what really enabled me to win without any risk was my refusal to let him get away with any overplays. As this game shows, if you combine that attitude with a five-stone handicap, you should win easily.

Subsequent moves omitted. Black wins by 64 points.

THIRD FIVE-STONE GAME

White: Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan
Black: Kenji Nakano, 3-dan (amateur)
35 years old. Proprieter of a coffee shop in Shizuoka.



Figure 1 (1–13)

Figure 1. *Difference of opinion.*

Now let's take a look at a game between a professional and an amateur. Concerning the pros and cons of Black 4:

Nakano: 'When I played 4 to 12, I was hoping to keep the game simple.'

Yokoyama: 'Black 4 was lukewarm. A contact play at 8 or 10 would have been better that 4.'

Kageyama: 'I'm sorry to make comments about Yokoyama's comments, but I think Black 4 was all right. It's the moves that followed that I can't approve of. Also, with 4, I think you could have changed direction completely and made an attachment at *p*. Not just "could have," I'd like to recommend *p* above all the other choices.'



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 1. The attachment at Black 1 is worth recommending on the grounds of simplicity, but beyond that, Black △ comes to be perfectly placed. If we assume the sequence from 2 to 6, Black 7 becomes an irresistable thick move. It would not be too much to say that the black formation dominates the entire board.

Kageyama: 'What do you think of that, Yoko?'

Yokoyama: 'Hmm, I have to admit that you're certainly right.'

Kageyama: 'I feel a bit let down to hear you just admit something like that.'

Nakano: 'Will you show me how I should have played after Black 4 in the actual game?'

Kageyama: 'If you play 1 in Dia. 2, the moves up to White 4 are necessary, but then Black 5 is correct, the hane and connection. The sequence continues with 6 to 9, and Black 9 takes hold of White △ nicely and makes good shape.'

Yokoyama: 'I still think Black 1 is lukewarm, but once you've played it, then I guess the hane and connection are the joseki.'



Figure 2 (1)

Figure 2. *Big points.*

Yokoyama: 'Most people think that Black 1, or a large knight's move one line to the right of it, is huge. That's probably because they figure that if White played 1, the whole upper side would become his territory, but instead of this kind of move, the san-ren-seis on the left and lower sides are always bigger.'

Nakano: 'I thought Black 1 was the key point in this opening.'

Kageyama: 'Try comparing the two diagrams on the next page. In the first diagram, it almost looks as if Black had a nine-stone handicap. In the second diagram, White's reaching the sides faster, and Black doesn't seem to have so much of an advantage. That should be clear without any explanation.'



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Figure 3 (1-9)

Figure 3. *Excellent move.*

Nakano: 'I thought I was doing pretty well when I made that pincer attack at 3, but then you hit me with a move I'd never dreamed of. My knees were trembling as I played Black 5 and 7. Were they all right?'

Yokoyama: 'You could have played *p* and put up a fight, but Black 5 was an excellent move. Up to White 8, whatever else may be true, you had pushed me down to the second line, and there can't be anything wrong for you in that. The questionable move was Black 9; that was funny. If you had first played Black *q*, White *r*, and then Black 9, mindless as that seems, you could have built yourself a perfect outside wall.'

Nakano: 'I thought I'd be laughed at if I played 9 at *q*.'



Figure 4 (1-10)

Figure 4. *The particular situation.*

Yokoyama: 'You could have cut with Black 7 at White 8—I noticed that right after I played 6. I would have played 7 and you would have connected at 10, and I had no effective ko threats anywhere, so I would have been in trouble.'

Nakano: 'I didn't think about it much. I just figured it had to be wrong to cut at 8 and have you come shooting out at 7. I guess my not-very-good common sense got in the way of my thinking.'

Kageyama: 'Nothing's less reliable than common sense in go. If you can't adjust yourself freely to the particular situation, you'll let precious opportunities slip right past you. This was one good example of that.'



Figure 5 (1-23)

⑩ *takes ko.* ⓭ *takes ko* ⓯ *connects the ko.*

Figure 5. *A ko fight.*

Nakano: 'I didn't know how to connect around the ko, so I decided to take the big point at 1 and wait to see what you would do.'

Yokoyama: 'That showed courage. If I had been you, I would have connected at 6. Anyway, since you had the brass to play like that, I had to cut at 2.

White 2 to 8 were more or less forced, but instead of Black 9, connecting the ko would have been more severe. If I hit you with 9, you could come down at *p*. Then no matter how much nerve I had, to continue with *q* and be cut at *r* would be pointless.'

Nakano: 'Is that true? My common sense told me I couldn't afford to be hit by White 9. That's why I played Black 9.'



Figure 6 (1-15)

Figure 6. *Far in the future.*

Nakano: 'I didn't know whether to play 8 or to cut you off with *p*.'

Yokoyama: 'I guess that was only natural. In this position it's hard to tell which is correct. There was no uncertainty about Black 12, however, that was terrible. What did you mean by that move?'

Nakano: 'I thought I might be able to play *q* in sente and do something to the white stones in the center.'

Yokoyama: 'You did? That was really looking far into the future. If you were going to do that, why didn't you exchange Black *r* for White *s* first, and then play 12?'

Nakano: 'I wasn't sure you'd answer Black *r*. Oh, I see, next Black *t* would be severe.'



Figure 7 (1-11)

Figure 7. *A damaging move.*

Kageyama: 'The way you went around answering White △ at Black ▲, White ◎ at Black 1, and White 2 at Black 3 was so negative, I didn't think you were trying to win any more.'

Yokoyama: 'The reason that I couldn't get the lead must have been the power of the handicap stones, and the fact that Nakano counter-attacked occasionally. For example, when I bent around him at 10, he cut at 11. He fought back when I was least expecting him to.'

Kageyama: 'Now that you mention it, he wasn't always on the defensive, was he. Black 11 was quite a damaging move. White seems to be in trouble.'



Figure 8 (1-16)

Figure 8. *Plain.*

Kageyama: 'You certainly didn't waste any time with White 1 to 9. Maybe this is typical bully behavior, but to forge straight ahead like this was too plain, wasn't it? If I had been you, I'd have played 1 at *p*, or in the corner at *q*, to see how Black answered and to try for some variation.'

Yokoyama: 'Right. Nakano was behaving himself so nicely that when he suddenly came out with something strong, I lost my composure.'

Kageyama: 'Maybe he was softening you up with all those slack moves so as to throw you off with a change of pace.'

Nakano: 'I never even thought of doing such a thing, but he did make it easy for me up to Black 16.'



Figure 9 (1-7)

Figure 9. *White territory.*

Nakano: 'To tell the truth, when White kept pushing me forward, I was afraid that he would get all the territory on the upper side, but I couldn't help answering those pushes, so I just let myself be pushed along. I never had time to think about whether I was ahead or behind in the game.'

Yokoyama: 'I played White 1 to see what Nakano would do, but when he made the right answer at 2, I had to settle for surrounding territory with 3. I didn't want to play White *p*, Black *q*, White *r*, because then he could have played 6.'

Nakano: 'I asked for time to think about my next move.'

Yokoyama: 'After that long huddle you had to come up with something decent, and you did indeed.'



Figure 10 (1-15)

Figure 10. *The game-winning move.*

Nakano: 'I was afraid of what might happen in the corner if I played 1 at 10, and if I took too firm a grip on the corner stone with 1 at 11, I'd be leaving you a monkey jump in the endgame, which would mean a loss. I considered this and considered that and finally managed to choose Black 1, but it looked so loose, I thought you might laugh at it.'

Yokoyama: 'Laugh at it? That was the move that won you the game. I put all I had into the endgame after that, but. . . .'

Nakano: 'I was thinking of White 2 and Black 3 as miai.'

Kageyama: 'Good for you. This wasn't the same Nakano who went around answering everything in the middle game. To be honest, I was afraid that you were going to answer White 2 at *p*.'



Figure 11 (1-21)

Figure 11. *A solid endgame.*

Yokoyama: 'It hurt to have to go back and defend at 7, but if I hadn't done so at this point, then Black *p*, White *q*, Black 7, White connects, Black *r*, White *s*, Black *t*, and I'd be done for, so I couldn't help it.'

Nakano: 'That's what I was aiming at from the beginning, but I was afraid of making a mistake, fouling it up, and taking a loss, so I kept putting it off.'

Kageyama: 'When you made all those slack moves during the middle game, I had the feeling you were going to lose, but you came on strong after that and nailed down the victory nicely. You're not weak at all. That was a solid endgame.'

Subsequent moves omitted. Black wins by 6 points.

FOUR STONE GAMES

To try to win by making territory is a niggardly way to play, and it will not get you anywhere. Once you see a target of white stones, attack, attack, and attack it again. Strike with a whole series of blows and make the stronger player tremble.

Savoring the thrill of attack is what makes handicap go fun. Once you open your eyes to the true meaning of the handicap stones, your progress will be remarkable.

Go is a pursuit of such value that one can devote a lifetime to it and have nothing to regret. Why not, then, challenge the limit of your powers.

FIRST FOUR-STONE GAME

White: Toshiro Kageyama, 6-dan
Black: Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan



Figure 1 (1-4)

Figure 1. *Slacker?*

Yokoyama: 'How many years has it been since I've taken four stones? What a pleasant feeling!'

Kageyama: 'Say, that Black 4 was a slack move. You should have invaded at *p*, or at *q*.'

Yokoyama: 'Say yourself, I think Black 4 was an excellent move. I was getting settled and waiting calmly for a chance to invade.'

Kageyama: 'It's slack. How can you not invade an extension as spread-out as White 1 and 3?'

Yokoyama: 'Maybe you like to jump in whenever the enemy spreads out, but I take a more studied approach.

I build up pressure slowly from the outside, and then come in for the kill.'

This did not sound like Yokoyama.



Figure 2 (1-4)

igure 2. *One-space pincer.*

Kageyama: 'White 1 makes one of the ideal shapes. I'm going to play this game slow and steady.'

Yokoyama: 'If you had left White 1 out and played somewhere else, I was planning to invade. That would have been pretty devastating—I don't expect you could have defended against it. Anyway, I think I got a nice fast opening development with the san-ren-sei at 2.'

At White 3, an invasion one point to the left of 4 would have been more unhurried, but then Black could have played on the upper side and got an even faster opening development. See if you can guess how I met the strong one-space pincer attack at Black 4.

Problem: Would you play White 5 at *A*, *B*, or *C*?



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

C

B (70%): White 1 is possible in certain circumstances, but here it is questionable, since it solidifies Black on the lower side. White 11 is met unexpectedly by Black 12, and is unsatisfactory.

C (100%): This White 1 is the standard move. It follows common sense, and everybody knows the sequence up to Black 6. This is safe and sound, but at the same time, it seems that White is doing what Black wants him to do.

A (100%): This White 1 refuses to go along with Black. It is necessary sometimes to follow that kind of strategy.



A



Figure 3 (1-10)

Figure 3. *Strong bad shape.*

White 1 and 3 are something like a joseki, which carries on from Black 4 to White 9, but Black 10 at *p* is the standard pattern.

Kageyama: 'In Black 10 I guess we're seeing the bully in you. I could never play a move like that.'

Yokoyama: 'I know it's bad shape, but I wanted to see what you'd do with it.'

How should White fight back?

Problem: For White 11, which of the following three is correct:

A, which starts fighting head-on.

B, blocking off one side and letting Black push through on the other.

C, an attachment, dodging away on another course.



A (70%): Even if you can't read out the sequence from 2 to 24, White 1, looked at just by itself, seems unreasonable.

B (100%): White blocks the left end with 1, and when Black pushes through at 2, White attacks the lower left corner with 3. There is still *a* to have fun with in the lower right corner. This is the correct answer.

C (80%): Since Black has two escape routes, at *a* and *b*, he can offer strong resistance with 4. White can make a ko, but he has no ko threats.



Figure 4 (1-10)

Figure 4. *Mistakes by both sides.*

White 1 was only an 80 per cent move, but since my opponent made a mistake at 2, White 1 became a more-than-100 per cent move. This is one of the things that makes go interesting. An 80 per cent move can turn out to be worth more or less than that, depending on the subsequent play.

To be allowed to live so regally in the lower right corner was a big success for me, or perhaps it should be termed a big failure for my opponent. White 7, however, carried a good thing too far. White *p*, on the upper side, was the biggest point.

Black peeped at 8, and I saw that it would be bad for me to connect at *q* and be attacked by Black 9, so I slipped away with 9 myself.

Problem: Choose from *A*, *B*, and *C* for White 11.



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

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

A

C (70%): If White plays 1, Black will connect at 2. The double hane, (Black 4 and 6), is a severe counter to White 3 and 5, forcing White to retreat at 7. Then Black gets 8, and White's result is unsatisfactory.

B (80%): The hane at 1 is common sense, but here it is good for Black to block at 2. It would be painful for White to connect at *a*, but to play 5 and be cut at 6 may be even more painful.

A (100%): Can it be good to pull back with 1 and let Black block at 2? Yes, it can. White is leaving himself the three-three point invasion at *a* to aim at, so Black cannot feel entirely comfortable after 2.



Figure 5 (1-5)

Figure 5. *Tricks.*

Instead of White 3, White 1 to 7 in Dia. 1, leaving *a* and *b* as miai, would have been more interesting. With the White 3 and Black 4 actually played, we started on one of Yoko's favorite patterns, so I decided to try some tricks with White 5.

Problem: Should Black answer at *A*, *B*, or *C*?



Dia. 1



A (100%): Black 1, bending over the top of the white stone, attacks the hardest. White would like to seek development with 2, but Black chases him relentlessly with 3 and 5, and White's position is in danger of collapsing. Other possibilities for White 2 must be considered, too, but I can find nothing very startling.



B (70%): If Black plays his hane from underneath at 1 and lets White press on him at 2, he is helping White to develop. Seeing that the ladder favors him, Black can continue with 3 and 5, but then White can make a ladder atari at *a* or an attachment at *b*, and has all kinds of interesting variations.



C (80%): This Black 1 avoids helping White to develop. It is also the safest move, but it leads to White 2 to 8, and White seems to have gotten a playable position. White 2 can also be placed high, one line to the left.



Figure 6 (1–7)

Figure 6. *Partially strangled.*

A bully like Yoko could hardly be expected to miss a move like Black 1, and Black 3, in response to White 2, seemed to have me at least partially strangled.

Kageyama: 'Perhaps I should have tried for shape with an attachment at *p* instead of playing 4.'

Yokoyama: 'Yes, that would have been better. White 4 was just plain unreasonable.'

Black naturally pushed through and cut with 5 and 7, and my plight was growing worse and worse. There had to be some way of getting out of this predicament.

Problem: For White 8, which is better: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



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

A

C (70%): For White to head immediately in this direction is doubtful. The sequence up to Black 6 is forced, and what is White going to do next? His movements are hampered by the presence of a group he cannot afford to sacrifice on the right side.

A (80%): To put everything into the upper side and allow the exchange up to Black 8 is a safe course, and although it lacks any great appeal, it is at least better than the previous diagram.



B

B (100%): White 1 and 3 are unexpectedly good in this position. After 7, White has a nose tesuji at 9, and 15 leaves him alive in the corner. These diagrams show only one variation stemming from each move, but this last looks like the best of the three.



Figure 7 (1-11)

Figure 7. *Attempting the impossible.*

Yokoyama: 'I never thought you'd play White 1. Clearly you were attempting the impossible.'

Kageyama: 'It shocked me, too. I must have picked up some of your bullyishness. I let things rub off on me too easily.'

Yokoyama: 'Looks like you've let me make up for my mistake in the lower right corner in the opening. To get to make such a nice play as 8 is almost too good to be true.'

I hit under the black stone with White 11, looking for a chance to counterattack.

Problem: Which do you prefer for Black 12: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



B



A



C

B (60%): Black 1 looks strong, but it isn't. Black cannot afford to let White play 2 and 4 and escape with the main body of his stones.

A (60%): To press on this side gives rise to the cross-cut tesuji at 2. If Black plays 3 and 5, White can escape with 6 and 8. The ko, (Black *a*, White *b*), holds terror for Black as well as for White.

If Black plays 3 at 6 in this sequence, White can play *c* and make a pon-nuki in sente. That is bad for Black, too.

C (100%): The correct answer is to extend to 1. With 6 and 7, White's three stones are stopped cold.

The value of the move depends, however, on the circumstances. In this situation Black 1 is the only correct answer, but if the situation were even slightly changed, Black 1 would not necessarily remain good. To be able to tell the difference one way or the other is to have the power to think for yourself.



Figure 8 (1-12)

Figure 8. *In a maze.*

Kageyama: 'Go is the type of game where once you take a wrong turn, you're in a kind of maze and it's not easy to find a way out. I made too heavy a shape in the upper right corner, and after that nothing happened the way I wanted it to. What was worse, after I started to go downhill, you came out with a good move like Black 1. That was too much.'

Yokoyama: 'There doesn't seem to be any logic to White 8 and 10. You should be ashamed of this diagram. Now let me give you one more unpleasant surprise and take my revenge for those five-stone games.'

Problem: Which is Black's strongest attack: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A



B



C

A (70%): Black 1 is better than 1 at 3 would be, but it lacks power. White can settle himself easily with 2 and 4.

B (70%): This is less forceful than *A*. There is nothing wrong with the idea of roasting White by robbing him of his eye space, but the method employed is questionable. It invites White to play 2 etc. and sacrifice two stones, which was not what was intended.

C (100%): The peep at Black 1 is correct. It demands the connection at 2 from White, and now Black can play 3 and enjoy himself in a large-scale attack.



Figure 9 (1-8)

Figure 9. *Last chance.*

It is interesting how once a game of go starts to take a turn for the good, the moves fall rigidly into place, one after the other. Black 1 and 3 were nice examples of this. A fierce light was burning in Yoko's owl-like eyes.

White 4 and 6 were a tesuji combination, but Black connected at 7 and they came to nothing.

With White 8 I pretended to be threatening to grip the black stone at *C*, but I was really aiming at a counterattack at *p*. I seemed to have given up the game, but I was still hoping for one last chance to score a reversal.

Problem: Where should Black play 9: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A



B



C

A (60%): Black 1 is gote, letting White capture an important stone in a ladder with 2.

B (100%): Black 1 is the local key point. It forces White 2 and ruins White's shape. Black should extend to 3 after this exchange. This is the best sequence.

C (80%): Black 1 is the ordinary idea, but it lets White play 2, 4, and 6 and manufacture a little eye shape to work with.



Figure 10 (1-10)

Figure 10. *Moving along smoothly.*

My opponent wrecked my shape with 1, then made the strong play at 3 in the center, continuing to move along smoothly. White 4 and 6 were a little unreasonable, but they held out some faint hope.

Black 7 was decisive. I wondered, when I played 8, if I was really going to get away.

Somewhere along the line Black had gotten forty-odd points of territory in the upper left and upper right corners, plus more than ten on the right side, and in addition, the white groups on the upper side, the right side, and the lower side were all threatened with danger. I had no chance left in this game.

Problem: Where would you play Black 11—at *A*, *B*, or *C*?

A



B



C



A (70%): Black 1 is too early. The sequence from White 2 onwards makes that all too clear.

B (100%): This Black 1 is best. After White 6, Black 7 becomes an ideal peeping tesuji.

C (90%): This Black 1 also follows correct principles; it is one possibility, but it suffers from looseness.



Figure 11 (1-19)

Figure 11. *Resignation.*

In the whole sequence from Black 1 to 15 Yoko's moves fell firmly into place. The group on the upper side just barely managed to link itself to the group on the left side, but while it was doing so, Black 7 and 9 were substantial.

After Black gained so much outer influence, the margin could only grow wider. I still had a formidable task in front of me in trying to save the group on the lower side, and I no longer had the courage to play on.

In this game you should observe Black's unrelenting severity. He never gave me a chance to catch my breath. The invasion that I had been hoping for at *p* in the lower left corner had faded into obscurity, and the game ended without its being played.

White resigns at Black 19.

COMMON SENSE CLASSROOM



Problem Diagram

Problem: Which peeping move is correct: *A* or *B*?

In this and other situations where you cannot cut, you should peep. Most people know that, but surprisingly many choose the wrong peeping move. This problem was given in an advanced go course at the Japanese Go Association, and out of about one hundred students, (shodan to 5-dan), only 25 per cent got it right, which shows how lacking amateurs are in go sense.



A



B

Answer: *A* is correct.

Whether to play White 3 immediately or not is another matter, but you should certainly be able to tell at one glance that White 1 in Dia. *A* is correct.

SECOND FOUR-STONE GAME

White: Toshiro Kageyama, 6-dan
Black: Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan



Figure 1 (1-7)

Figure 1. *Verbal battle.*

This game began with an outspoken verbal battle.

Kageyama: 'This time I'm not going to lose.'

Yokoyama: 'What do you mean you're not going to lose? Do you think you can give me four stones and beat me?'

Kageyama: 'It doesn't matter how crazy a game it is, you have to play to win.'

Yokoyama: 'That may be true, but really, you don't have a chance.'

Kageyama: 'Don't be so sure. You never know who's going to win before the game starts.'

The pincer attack at 2 showed a defiant attitude right from the beginning. The double kakari at 3 is standard strategy for White in handicap games.



Figure 2 (1–11)

Figure 2. *Professional move.*

The sequence from Black 1 to White 10 is a joseki, one that most amateurs shodan and above seem to know. The question is what to do after it.

The way Black moved in at 11 could be called typical of Yokoyama, but he is a 5-dan professional, so he can make this kind of move. If an amateur played this way against an opponent four stones stronger than him and found himself invaded straightaway at *p* and challenged to a free-for-all with his two stones 11 and △ split apart, the difference in strengths would soon make itself apparent and the game would be over.

Perhaps most of my readers want to disagree, but I have had plenty of people come at me with Black 11 in four-stone teaching games, and even though they play 11 without hesitation, they all make mistakes in the moves that follow and end up with hopeless positions.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. When White plays 2, the expected development is for Black to jump out to 3 and keep pressing up to 15. Where is the free-for-all in this sequence? Where can the difference in strengths make itself apparent? I cannot understand it myself, no matter how I try, but amateurs will miss moves that look only natural to a professional, and even without that, if White plays 12 at 15 and makes a double kakari he can cause a disturbance.

If Black *a*, White *b*, and Black *c* follow, Black does not seem to be in any trouble, but for some reason most people do not like to be caught in a double kakari. They do not like it, so their position starts to look bad to them, and once they adopt that attitude, they cannot possibly win. This kind of thinking must be gotten rid of without delay.

Now let's return to the game under discussion.

Problem: White has three sensible choices, *A*, *B*, and *C*, for his next move. Which do you think is considered best?



A

A (80%): White 1 has the advantage of speed, but there is no mistaking the disadvantage in giving Black the forcing play at 2, and White 3 makes Black 4 a good move. If we balance the advantage against the disadvantages, we find this sequence unsatisfactory.



B

B (100%): The tight way to play is to press at 1, and answer Black 2 with the counter-hane at 3.



C

C (70%): This White 1 is a novel move, but if Black answers with 2, 4, and 6, White loses any chance to aim into the lower side, and his position becomes uninteresting.



Figure 3 (1–15)

Figure 3. *Momentum.*

See the way our momentum carried us forward in the sequence from 1 to 15. Both sides were fighting to build up influence. It would be hard to change any of these moves. For example:

If White omitted 7, it would be good for Black to press there.

If Black played 8 around *p*, a white jump forward to 11 would light up the whole board.

If White played 9 at *p*, Black could, leaving the lower side alone, make a pleasing extension to 9 himself.

And so on—the fighting continued with neither player able to disengage.

Problem: Would you play Black 16 at *A*, *B*, or *C*?

A



A (100%): This is the honest move. It makes *a* and *b* miai, and is one correct answer.

B



B (60%): White connects at 2, making *a* and *b* miai. Black's position is bad. Black 1 looks strong, but is really weak.

C



C (100%): This is the strongest way to play. White 2 is the key point for making shape. Black extends forward to 3 and steels himself for battle, putting his efforts into building up influence.



Figure 4 (1–17)
⑮ connects

Figure 4. *Middle game technique.*

The battle was growing fiercer and fiercer. If at any time White surrounded the lower left corner, as in Dia. 2, Black could live with 1 to 9; thus Black could feel safe fighting in the center.

Yokoyama: 'Black *p*, instead of Black 5 in the figure, would probably have been stronger.'



Dia. 2

I wanted to play White 6 at *C*, but I was not confident about being able to deal with Black 9, White 10, followed by an attachment one point above *C*.

Problem: How must White play 18: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A (70%): White 1 and 3 can only be termed mediocre. Black 4 makes 5 and 6 miai, and White is in a distasteful position.



B (90%): White 1 and 3 look dangerous, but Black has his center stones to worry about, and even if he cuts with 6, White can get by with 7. If Black connects at 8, White pushes through at 9 and fights.



C (100%): To probe from this direction shows high-level strategy. The idea is to get the large white group settled, then play all out on the right side.



Figure 5 (1-17)

Figure 5. *Unreasonable.*

I did not really approve of my own boldness when I played 3, but at least I caught my opponent by surprise.

Yokoyama: 'Haha, stop being unreasonable.'

I caught him by surprise, but he looked happy. He could not stop laughing. Maybe my move was a little unreasonable, but I thought that if I did not try something like this, I would never get a chance to win.

The moves from 4 to 17 were natural for both sides, so we played them very quickly.

Problem: For Black 18, which is correct: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A (100%): Black 1 is sharp. If White plays 2, Black connects at 3, and after White 4, Black *a* would take away White's eye shape. That makes Black 1 the correct answer.



B (60%): Black 1 is uninspired. White will descend to 2, and even if Black plays *a*, he cannot kill the big white group to the left. Black gets nothing out of this move. If he plays *b* instead of *a*, he will have trouble with White *c*.



C (60%): Even if Black starts with 1, the big white group can live, and as long as *a* and *b* are miai, Black can gain nothing.



Figure 6 (1-19)

Figure 6. *Professionals are human.*

Perhaps I should have cut with White 4 at 5, and White 14, which should have been an extension at 15, was certainly a bad move.

Yokoyama: 'There was no reason not to peep at 18 with Black 17. We were both lacking in precision around here.'

Even professionals are human, and you cannot expect perfection from them. The question is whether you can take advantage of their mistakes. Amateurs seem not to notice most of their opponents' wrong moves.

Problem: With 20, what is the best way for White to live: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



Figure 7 (1-10)

Figure 7. *Misperception.*

C is the correct answer to the problem in the last figure. *B* is worth 80 per cent. *A* is worth 30 per cent, for if White plays *A*, the white group to the left dies. White 1, accordingly, should have been played at *p*.

Kageyama: 'Aside from that, White 7 was a horrible misperception. If I don't play *q* and make the group on the left live, there's no use continuing. Let me take it back.'

Yokoyama: 'Let a professional take a move back—what do you mean? Don't say anything so disgraceful. White 7 at *q* certainly would seem to leave you alive. Next Black 8, White 9, and if I play Black 10, White *r* makes *s* and *t* miai, so you're alive. Or if I play *t* instead of 10, you can live with *u*. Too bad, but you can't take it back.'



Figure 8 (1-11)

Figure 8. *Pity.*

Kageyama: 'What a pity to go and ruin such a good game. I must have lost forty points.'

Yokoyama: 'Don't try to kid me, you haven't lost that much, and this wasn't such a good game for you anyway. All you can say is that you were doing better than in the last game.'

Kageyama: 'Well then, let's not count White 7 in the last figure.'

Yokoyama: 'You're not going to get away with that. And speaking of taking moves back, that's something that Yasunaga was a genius at. He could make you feel that it would be honorable to take the move back, and dishonorable not to.'

Problem: Should Black play 12 at *A*, *B*, or *C*?



Figure 9 (1-21)

Figure 9. *Unnecessary quarrel.*

Black 1 is the correct answer to the problem in the last figure. The other choices are not as good as it.

White 6 started a strong attack on the upper right corner, but Black 7 and 9 were an excellent response, and I could not do anything exciting. It was odd for Black, however, to pick an unnecessary quarrel with 13. He should have played 16, or some move like that, instead.

I took profit with 14 and 16, while Black 15 took a point that was worth nothing. The whole sequence up to Black's double hane at 19 and 21 looked unavoidable. Next I came down on the board with a stong play. Can you figure it out before you look at the next page?



Figure 10 (1-10)

Figure 10. *Reaping in sente.*

I thought that White 1 and 3 were rather good; I reaped this harvest in sente. Having sente at this point in the game was worth quite a bit.

The black area on the left was more than merely big. It was so big that no matter what I did to it, we were already past the stage where I could try to win the game. If I resigned, however, I was afraid that Yoko would make me play it over, so I wanted to narrow the margin somehow. That was all I was hoping for. There had been no place in this game where I could say, 'If I'd played *that* way, I had a chance to win,' but after all, I was giving a four-stone handicap.

Problem: Which is best for White 11: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A

A (100%): This is the only move White has. If Black cuts at 2, White can do quite well. If Black also plays 6, White gets a splendid result.



B

B (60%): Black can stop this White 1 with 2, which is not very encouraging.



C

C (50%): White 1 is a beginners' move that does not get anywhere. Black 4 stops White.



Figure 11 (1–10)

Figure 11. *Last chance.*

White 1, 3, 5, Black 2, 4, 6—even after making Black tremble this much I could not narrow the margin. It was time to give up. Black had about ninety points on the left side. I could hardly believe he had made such a big territory. My last chance was to invade the lower side.

Yokoyama: 'It would be amateur thinking to want to defend at *B* when White came in at 9. Then White would play 10 and get in from both sides. You have to learn to see 9 and 10 as miai.'

Kageyama: 'I acknowledge your valued opinion.'

Problem: With 11, should White come in to *A*, *B*, or *C*?



B



A



C

B (50%): White 1 is too simple; it makes life easy for Black. It is clear that White has done nothing.

A (100%): This I can approve of. White meets Black 6 with 7 and starts a ko in which Black has the more to fear. If he loses the ko, his whole goup will be in critical condition. That makes the ko welcome, and accordingly *A* is the best answer.

C (80%): This goes in two steps deeper than *B*, but one step shallower than *A*. It is certainly available as an alternative. White has 3 and 5 ready with which to meet the black tesuji at 2, and he cannot be captured. He can easily live or link up, one or the other, so he has nothing to fear. It is hard to make a simple comparison between this and *A*, but the conclusion is that Black is more afraid of *A*.



Figure 12 (1-12)

Figure 12. *Counterattack.*

Yokoyama: 'I was afraid you were going to peep with White 1 at *p*.'

Kageyama: 'I didn't realize you were in a state of anxiety—I was too much worried about what might happen to me.'



Dia. 3

Yokoyama counterattacked at 2, and nothing was going well for me. When I cut at 7 he came ploughing in from the rear at 8, and I did not know what to do.

If I had played White 13 at 1 in Dia. 3 and made the exchange up to 5, it looks as if I could have taken a profit, but by now I could not see anything.



Figure 13 (1–10)

Figure 13. *Overwhelming victory.*

I should have followed Dia. 3 on the previous page instead of playing 1; the way I linked up from 1 to 9 was miserable indeed. I should have picked up at least ten points here. My usual skill deserted me during the endgame, which I played in a state of psychological collapse.

Once again in this game, Black's fierce attack had sent White reeling. My feeling that I had to get a little extra caused an error on the lower side, the white group in the lower left corner died a needless death, and it was all over.

Black's aggressiveness brought him a huge territory on the left side. One man could not have surrounded so much territory alone.

Subsequent moves omitted. Black wins by 52 points.

THIRD FOUR-STONE GAME

White: Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan

Black: Yoshio Suzuki, amateur 4-dan

42 years old. An executive in the Teiso Chemical Corporation in Shizuoka.



Figure 1 (1–10)

Figure 1. *A quick opening.*

Suzuki: 'Black 6 at 7 is the usual move, but my strategy was to develop quickly.'

Yokoyama: 'I wouldn't want to play Black 6 myself, but it may be one possible idea. White 7 at *p* would have linked all my stones together, but it was so low that I couldn't bring myself to play it.'

Suzuki: 'Look at the way I zipped around the sides with 8 and 10—this was really a quick opening.'

Yokoyama: 'That's just as you say; it almost looks as if I'd given you an eight-stone handicap.'

Suzuki: 'The way you nearly caught up with me anyway was frightening.'



Figure 2 (1-10)

Figure 2. *Honest move.*

Kageyama: 'White 1 was an unusually honest move for you, Yoko.'

Yokoyama: 'If I made a second kakari with 1 instead of invading at the three-three point, I'd expect Black 2 to 6 in Dia. 1. Black 6 works too well with Black △, so I didn't play that way.'



Dia. 1

Suzuki: 'I was planning to draw back to the three-three point if you made a double kakari.'

Yokoyama: 'Then the difference in our strengths would have made itself known.'



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Kageyama: 'If Black answers White 1 at 2 in Dia. 2, he can't avoid 3 and 4 and a hard fight. After the moves up to White 11, it looks as if Black's going to have his hands full. He needs an awful lot of confidence to start a fight like this.'

Yokoyama: 'Black doesn t have to try anything so difficult; the easy way in Dia. 1 is good enough.'

Kageyama: 'Let's proceed. Black 2 to White 9 in the figure were necessary, and Black 10 is locally a joseki, but. . . .'

Yokoyama: 'It was slack. A professional would have pushed straight out at 1 and 3 in Dia. 3 and been proud of all his outer influence.'

Kageyama: 'That's the large-scale way to play.'

Suzuki: 'Is it really good to go pushing the other guy along in front of you with 1 and 3?'

Yokoyama: 'If Black △ weren't there I wouldn't advise you to "push the other guy along in front of you," but since Black △ is waiting in the place you're pushing him toward, it works well.'



Figure 3 (1-10)

Figure 3. *Scolded for playing joseki.*

Suzuki: 'I never dreamed I'd be scolded for playing a joseki move like Black 1.'

Kageyama: 'Joseki are always just local moves. There are plenty of times when the overall situation on the board makes a joseki bad. Aside from that, White 2 to 8 were rather heavy-handed—Yoko's patented "main-force" style. I would never have done anything like that. We may both be professionals, but we play differently all the same.'

Suzuki: 'The way Yokoyama keeps drubbing away at you can drive you to despair. I thought White 6 and 8 were a bit reckless and random, but he's stronger than me, so he could make something out of them.'



Figure 4 (1-8)

Figure 4. *A terrible move.*

Kageyama: 'White's strategy in the last figure is about what you can expect from Yokoyama, but I think it was a bit reckless too. Still, you have to punish him for his recklessness. Black 1 was a terrible move. If you had cut at 1 in Dia. 4 and connected at 3, then since the ladder was broken, he would have been in a fix.'



Dia. 4

Suzuki: 'I didn't do that because I thought it would be asking for trouble to let him play a ladder atari.'

Kageyama: 'Ladder atari? All he could do would be to attach a stone to your stone in the lower left corner. If you played *a* in Dia. 4, the game would be as good as over.'

Suzuki: 'That's right. I didn't think I could afford to let him tear apart the big territorial framework I had built up in the lower left, but now that you say so, I guess I could have made up for it in the upper right corner.'

Kageyama: 'If you catch on as soon as it's explained to you, you're not completely hopeless. Most people can't understand no matter how much explanation they get.'

Suzuki: 'The way you go back and forth, I'm not sure whether I'm being praised or laughed at.'

Yokoyama: 'You're being praised.'



Dia. 5

Suzuki: 'I really didn't expect White 4 in the figure. After Black 1 and 3, I thought for sure that you were going to cut at 1 in Dia. 5 instead, which I figured I could handle well enough with Black 2 to 6.'

Yokoyama: 'White has no chance in that fight. I had no alternative but to push at White 4 in the figure.'

Kageyama: 'Which means that this wasn't a very effective way to play. It made the game too easy for Black.'



Figure 5 (1–10)

Figure 5. *Black misses again.*

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 was a good move. If I had played White 4 at 6, you could have made a one-point jump out from Black △, followed by White 7 and another one-point jump, and then that strong white wall would have gone to waste. For that reason I peeped at 4 to make you heavier, but I was actually a bit afraid you might answer me with Black *p* instead of Black 5.'

Suzuki: 'Of course Black 5 at *p* was my first idea, but I thought that might be just what you wanted. If we played 1, 2, and so on in Dia. 6, (next page), you'd probably cut with White 6. I didn't think that'd be so good for me.'

Yokoyama: 'The trouble with you amateurs is that you stop thinking at the point where White cuts.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

'If Black plays 1 in Dia. 7 after Dia. 6, White's in a fix. If he doesn't play 2, Black 2 will capture his stone. But if he does play 2 and Black plays 3, then White 4 and so on are sheer recklessness. Provided Black doesn't make a mistake, White gets crushed. I kept quiet when you and Kage were calling all of my plays reckless, but they weren't really reckless. If you want to see an example of real recklessness, look at Dia. 7.'

Kageyama: 'All right, professor, we understand. In the figure, Black played 7, giving up the stone marked △ on the upper side and putting his hopes on the left side, but I don't see why he couldn't have cut into the knight's move at *p*, followed by White *q*, Black *r*, White *s*, and Black 10. Black 7 was insipid. It was a shame to give up Black △.'

Suzuki: 'Sacrificing it was the simplest way to show contempt for the white wall. I actually thought of pushing at 10 with Black 9.'

Yokoyama: 'You should have done that.'



Figure 6 (1-12)

Figure 6. *Weak.*

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 was weak. In this kind of situation you have to hane at 2.'

Suzuki: 'But if I played 1 at 2, you'd cut at *p*, wouldn't you.'

Yokoyama: 'I wouldn't be that reckless. Black 3 and 5 in Dia. 8 would put me in trouble right away.'

Suzuki: 'If my opponent had been anyone else, I would have played the hane.'

Yokoyama: 'That's taking your opponent into account too much.'



Dia. 8



Figure 7 (1-16)

Figure 7. *Blind flight.*

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 at 13, to take away my eye space, would have been sharper. Black 1, 3, and 5 were one bad move after another, and on top of them, Black 7 was sheer blindness. I guess this is what they call a windfall.'

Kageyama: 'It's just as Yoko says. Something must have suddenly happened to you.'

Yokoyama: 'Instead of Black 3, you should have connected at 6. Black 5 should have been played at 13. Black 7 should have been an atari at 8. If you had played Black 11 at 13, you might still have salvaged something.'

Suzuki: 'I'm ashamed to admit it, but I thought all those moves were good. I guess I made myself look even weaker than I am.'



Figure 8 (1-16)

Figure 8. *Despised.*

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 was an awful move—just like a nine-stone game. No four-dan should play a move like that.'

Suzuki: 'I figured that since the white stones in the area were strong, you were about to try something desperate. I knew I'd be laughed at, but I decided to solidify my position anyway.'

Yokoyama: 'If you were going to play on the lower side, Black *p* would have threatened Black *q*. Therefore I would've defended at *r*, and you could've solidified yourself with *s*. If I played White 1, you could answer at *t* and not suffer very much.'

Kageyama: 'It's certainly not wrong to play your own game and put forth your own ideas, even if you get laughed at, but if you make moves as bad as Black 1, the other player will start despising you. Look at the way White played 12.'



Figure 9 (1-26)

Figure 9. *Crucial point.*

Yokoyama: 'My opponent had been playing terribly ever since figure 7, so I thought I might be able to get away with something a little unreasonable, but then he suddenly made a strong move at 1. I didn't know what to do. White 2 and so on were desperation measures.'

Kageyama: 'If he had played Black 13 at *p*, you would have been captured.'

Yokoyama: 'That's right. Why didn't you try to capture me?'

Suzuki: 'I couldn't read out who would win the race to capture, so I chose the safe course. Was I being too easy on you?'

Yokoyama: 'Living with White 18 was pretty big. I planned to play 24 and have you defend at 26, then play 25 and have an easy win, but you saved your reputation by taking the crucial point with Black 25.'



Figure 10 (1-20)

Figure 10. *Forty-odd points.*

Yokoyama: 'How is it that after my opponent made all those bad moves on the left and lower sides, his taking the one crucial point at Black △ kept me from winning?'

Kageyama: 'He had forty-odd points of secure territory on the right side—that was a lot.'

Yokoyama: 'If he had played Black 3 at *p*, the game would've been over, and Black 5 was funny, too. It was so funny that it made me play a funny move; White 10 was terrible. White 10 had to be played at *q*, of course.'

Suzuki: 'After I saved the lower side with 9 and saved my center group with 11, I thought I still had some chance in the battle of territories.'



Figure 11 (1-28)

Figure 11. *Good moves.*

Yokoyama: 'I thought White 4 and 6 were hoping for a little too much, but if I hadn't tried something here, I wouldn't have had a chance.'

Suzuki: 'I wasn't absolutely confident that I could live on the upper side with Black 13 and so on, but I thought that if I didn't try, the game would be close and I'd probably lose.'

Yokoyama: 'You were really unshakable in that life-and-death fight on the upper side. Black 19, 21, 23, 25, one good move after another. I don't understand how a person as unshakable as you could have made all those bad moves in the middle game. If I'd left out White 24 you'd have played there, and if I'd played White 26 at 27, then Black *p*, White *q*, Black 26, and you could have fought a ko with profit already taken in the corner. You had all kinds of ko threats, so I couldn't do that.'



Figure 12 (1-20)

Figure 12. *Unbalanced.*

Yokoyama: 'I was intending to resign if you played Black 1 at 4.'

Suzuki: 'I knew there was something in the corner, but I didn't think you could invade that easily. If I'd played Black 11 at 12, you'd have given atari at *p*, and I couldn't have connected.'

Yokoyama: 'I've never seen anyone play like you—so strong in some places and so weak in others. After your little mishap in the upper right corner I thought I was back in business, then all of a sudden you came on strong with 13 to 20. After suffering that damage, I couldn't see any way to win.'

Suzuki: 'I guess you mean my game is unbalanced. After my failure in the upper right corner, I half expected to lose.'



Figure 13 (1–30)

Figure 13. *Carrying it off.*

Suzuki: 'I was relieved when you connected at 10. I had been worried that you might come after me with a placement at 11.'

Yokoyama: 'I could've gotten a ko that way, but I didn't try it because it would clearly have been hopeless. From this figure on I had no chance to stage a reversal. Your strategy of unbalance threw me off in this game.'

Kageyama: 'They say that the luck of the moment decides the winner, and this game certainly showed us that. The way you went to pieces in the middle game was extraordinary. Everything indicated that you were going to lose, but then you picked youself up and fought your way into the upper side like a changed person. Carrying that off was what made you win.'

Subsequent moves omitted. Black wins by 4 points.

THREE STONE GAMES

The number of handicap stones is becoming rather small, but Black still holds the initiative, just as before. The game starts with only black stones to be seen on the board. If Black intensifies his aggressive attitude in this environment, victory will fall naturally into the palm of his hand.

It is said that the secret of sumo wrestling is to come charging out of the stance and push the other wrestler from the ring before he has time to take a breath. Handicap go is the same, whatever the handicap. Once you have felt the strong sensation of using the handicap stones to settle the game with one mighty effort in the opening, you will have moved a step closer to the realm of the professional go player.

FIRST THREE-STONE GAME

White: Toshiro Kageyama, 6-dan
Black: Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan



Figure 1 (1-6)

Figure 1. *Patented trick.*

Kageyama: 'When a pro gives another pro a three-stone handicap, I don't suppose he can win even one game out of ten.'

Yokoyama: 'That's right, it would be unthinkable for Black to lose—not that I'd want to stake my life on that, however.'

Kageyama: 'What about Black 4 in this game? I've never seen that move before. You shouldn't try to make fun of me.'

Yokoyama: 'Who was making fun of you? I have faith in that move; I've tried it in several of my games and had good luck with it.'

Kageyama: 'Oho, we're seeing one of your patented tricks, are we?'



Figure 2 (1-12)

Figure 2. *A common tesuji.*

Kageyama: 'Suppose I had defended the upper side with White 1.'

Yokoyama: 'I'd have attacked at *p*.'

Kageyama: 'I figured that would lead to a fight, which is why I defended at White 1, but you attacked at Black 2, so I guess we couldn't avoid a fight.'

Yokoyama: 'It was kind of you to play White 3. Black 4 to 8 looked very elegant. Why didn't you play White 3 at 6?'

Kageyama: 'Right you are. I was trying to get out too fast, and made a horrible move.'

Problem: Which is the best way for White to answer Black's cross-cut at 12: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A (100%): White 1 is a powerful counterattack. If Black connects at 2, White can capture a stone with 3 and 5, and after Black 6, he can aim at the sequence White *a*, Black *b*, White *c*, Black *d*, White *e*, which reduces Black to one eye. This is the correct way for White to play.



⑪ *connects*

B (60%): White 1 is a bad move, and White 3 is unreasonable. Black can squeeze White beautifully with 4 etc., and the result up to 14 is bad for White. White has to retreat by playing 3 at 7, but then an atari at 3 gives Black an easy position.



C (80%): White 1 is the common-sense move, but after White connects with 5, Black's corner is too springy; he can play *a*, White *b*, Black *c*, and make a ko. Above all, White has been forced. It hurts him to be so submissive.



Figure 3 (1–9)
⑤ *connects*

Figure 3. *Slight loss.*

Yokoyama: 'I have the feeling I rushed that attachment and cross-cut. Since you played White 1, it didn't go very well for me. I had to fight back by giving atari at 2, but then I couldn't connect at 7 with Black 6, or you'd have made the hane left of 6 and gotten too easy a position. I had to keep you cut off with 6, but when you cut at 7, I don't know what I had accomplished in the corner.'

Kageyama: 'That's right, you took a slight loss. When you played Black 8, I probably could have answered peacefully with 9 at *C*.'

That, however, is probably what my opponent had been trying to talk me into.

Problem: Faced with White's warlike answer at 9, where should Black play 10: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A (100%): Black 1 begins a deliberate plan of sacrifice. After 3 and 4, if Black plays 6 White can play 5 and win the race to capture, but Black 5 is beautiful. Black answers White 6 with 7 etc. and, as you can see, comes comfortably out on top.



B (50%): Black would like to try fighting with this 1, but White 2 to 10 follow. If Black links up with 11 and 13, White *a* and *b* become miai and Black is in trouble. If he plays 11 at 14, a white placement at *c* gives him worse trouble. This sequence thus ends in failure.



C (60%): Black would like to forge ahead at 1, too, but somehow this turns out badly. If he omits 3, White can separate him at *a*, and if he plays 5, White 6, 8, and 10 ruin his position. He has to play 5 at 8, but that leaves him in a strained shape, and he will face a white attack.



Figure 4 (1-17)

Figure 4. *Black grasps the initiative.*

Black 1 to White 10 seemed unavoidable. In sente my opponent stopped me from cutting at *p*, and swept down upon my group on the upper side. At one stroke he had grasped the initiative in the opening.

Kageyama: 'When you attacked at Black 11, my hopes of winning evaporated, and all the fun went out of the game.'

Yokoyama: 'Yes, but if I hadn't played Black 11 and had let you play *q*, it would have been the other way around. Black 11 was too important to miss.'

Black's attack flowed smoothly from 11 to 17.

Problem: White is in for a hard time no matter how he plays, but see which you think is better: *A*, *B*, or *C*.



A (60%): White 1 has no effect on the black stones on the upper side, so Black will outflank White further with 2. This can hardly be good for White.



B (80%): If White plays this 1 Black will defend at 2, but compare this White 1, which approaches the defended black position, with the next.



C (100%): It is better for White not to get near the upper side, so White 1 in this diagram is the correct answer. If White played 1 at *a*, Black could make do by exchanging *b* for *c* and then outflank White at the key point *d*.



Figure 5 (1-8)

Figure 5. *Typical.*

Kageyama: 'My push at White 3 was the key play affecting the rise and fall of power in the center. Black 4, 6, and 8 were typical of a bully like you—really tough. Ordinarily Black would play 4 at 6, followed by White 7 and a double hane at *p*. Instead of White 7, though, I had to play White *A* first.'

Yokoyama: 'I thought the game was over when I cut at 8.'

In truth, after Black 8, my position was beyond salvation.

Problem: How should White handle Black's strong attack—with *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A (*100%*): White 1 shows good timing. If Black defends at 2, White 7 works splendidly. White *d* takes care of Black *a*, White *b*, Black *c*.



C (*50%*): White 1 is barbaric. Black plays 2 to 6 and White is in terrible condition.



B (*60%*): White 1 may be the honest move, but it does nothing. The sequel is exactly the same as in the last diagram.



Figure 6 (1–11)

Figure 6. *Strong players are shifty.*

Yokoyama: 'The position demanded Black 2; this wasn't the time to defend at 3.'

Had he defended, then as Dia. A on the last page showed, everything would have gone my way. There is a saying that 'strong players are shifty', which means that they are not afraid of changing course in midstream. A person who took a fixed view of the upper side as black territory would fear White's penetration at 3 more than anything else and want to defend there with Black 2. That would not do. The sequence from Black 2 to White 11 was necessary for both sides.

Problem: Black would like to play 12 at *A*, *B*, or *C*. Where would you play?



A (0%): Black 1 is a tale of woe. Against White 2 and 4 Black can do nothing.



C (80%): It almost looks as if Black can cut at 1 and continue with 3, but White rescues himself magnificently with 4. Still, Black can more or less barricade White in with 5 to 9, so this answer is semi-correct.



B (100%): Black 1 is superb. White probably has to defend at 2, but Black barricades him in with 3 to 9. Compared with the one in the previous diagram, this barricade is much tighter.



Figure 7 (1-9)

Figure 7. *Careless.*

Black 1 was a terrible careless move by Yokoyama. It was amusing to watch a professional make such a simple mistake. Apparently he couldn't see that I would push him out with White 2. Mumbling self-imprecations under his breath to steady his nerve, he occupied the large point at 3 on the lower side.

If he had played 3 at *p* to thicken the wall in the center, a soft move, I would have invaded the lower side at *q*.

The one-point pincer attack at 7 is a favorite of Yokoyama's. He likes to play hard. The ordinary move would have been Black 7 at 8.

Problem: Where should White play 10? Choose from *A*, *B*, and *C*.



A



B

A (100%): White cannot expect anything much unless he goes as far as 1. If Black defends with 2 to 8, White can feel proud of having pressed him down to the third line.

B (80%): This is the right direction in which to play. If Black plays 2, White can attach 3 to it and find refuge in the center. Still, Black gets a simple and good development with 4 and 6.



C

C (70%): Black chases after White 1 with 2, and White is in trouble. He would like to jump in to 3, but Black will cut into his knight's move at 4 and give him more trouble.



Figure 8 (1-15)
⓬ connects at ⑦

Figure 8. *Professional sense.*

Kageyama: 'Considering who my opponent was, I thought seriously of holding back with White 1 at 3, but that would have been too lukewarm. I knew a bully like you would play Black 2 and 4.'

The cut at White 7 is a common tesuji.

Yokoyama: 'That nice little slap at Black 14 made me feel that this fight wasn't going badly.'

This feeling of Yoko's showed professional sense. I wonder if my readers can comprehend it.

Problem: Should Black play 16 at *A*, *B*, or *C*? Find the best move.

C



C (50%): Black 1 seeks to link up, whatever the shame invloved, but nothing good can come of such starvation measures. White has an easy time of it in the forced sequence that follows. (⑮ takes the ko.)

B



B (60%): This may be better than the last diagram, but the position seems to make White 4 and 6 possible, and Black is not doing well.

A



A (100%): Black 1 is a tesuji, and if White connects at 2, Black will keep pushing with 3. If Black answers White 4 by playing 5 one line above 3 and keeps extending while White crawls underneath, he may even be able to afford to sacrifice his six stones, although in fact it is not so easy for White to capture them.



Figure 9 (1–18)
⑮ takes ko. ⑰ takes five stones.

Figure 9. *Large ko fight.*

Kageyama: 'When I played 2 and 4, I didn't realize you could make the throw-in at 7 first. All I saw was Black 7 at 9, followed by White 10, and if you played 7 after that, I could answer at 11, so I thought I was safe.'

Yokoyama: 'It's amusing to watch a professional make such a simple mistake.'

Kageyama: 'Heavens, you're even taking verbal revenge on me.'

Black 11 started a large ko fight, and since I had no ko threats other than White 16 and 18 in the lower right corner, I was pushed into a decisively unfavorable position.

Problem: With 19, how should Black defend the lower right corner: at *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A

A (100%): Black 1 looks tame, but it is not so. If White plays 2, Black can press with 3 and 5, making the sequence Black *a*, White *b*, Black *c*, which spoils White's eye shape, a powerful threat. In this game, actually, it would be good for Black to play 5 at *d* to hold White in.



C



B

C (70%): The cut at Black 1 is a strong tesuji, but White seems likely to fight back with 2 to 6. If Black then plays *a* and starts the ko, he will find himself risking a great deal. This way is not safe.

B (70%): But this Black 1 is rather dull, and to connect at 3 when White gives atari at 2 makes it even duller. White's group gets stronger and stronger as the plays 4.



Figure 10 (1-16)

Figure 10. *Garbage.*

Kageyama: 'Having you capture that group on the right side was too much. Those two stones marked △, which should have been so useful, are just so much garbage now, and the fun of trying to win has gone out of the game. This is silly.'

Yokoyama: 'It's good for you to taste this kind of misery once in a while. Don't think I'm going to let up on you, no matter how much you rant and rave.'

Kageyama: 'You're heartless. All right, White 2 to 16 were my way of fighting back, and I think I accomplished something. You seem to be munching on the garbage stones.'

Problem: Which is better for Black 17: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A



B

A (60%): It is wrong thinking of Black to try to make territory against such a firm wall as he has. Once White plays 2, Black cannot but get a bad result; he has little chance to make any further territory.

B (80%): It is clearly better to push from this direction than to play 1 in *A*, but this does not put any pressure on White.



C

C (100%): Black 1 is the only correct move. White has various ways to connect—2, *a*, and *b*—and it will be fun to watch him try to choose among them. If he plays 2, Black has a peeping tesuji at 3.



Figure 11 (1-8)

Figure 11. *Tesuji.*

Kageyama: 'You're really finding the tesuji today, aren't you. If you had played Black 3 at 4, I was planning a clamping move at 3.'

Yokoyama: 'Perhaps I should have played Black 5 at 6, but I was carried away by my own speech about not letting up on you.'

From Black 5 through White 8 both sides were showing their determination not to yield, but that does not mean that we were not reading the position out. Even Yoko the Bully has his vulnerabilities. He tends often to ruin good games by becoming too brave. I was waiting for that to happen.

Problem: Please think about which would be better for Black 9: *A*, *B*, or *C*.



B (50%): Black 1 does not work, and it really should not be given any points. White clearly wins the race to capture. If Black plays 7 one line lower, then White 8, Black 11, White 9, and White still wins.



A (60%): This is not very different from the previous diagram, another failure for Black.



C (100%): Black 1 is an absolutely necessary, unrelenting move. It invites White 2 and forces the sequence up to 6, after which Black should cut at 7. With 10, White is in a low position and Black has surrounded a large center, making Black 1 a success.



Figure 12 (1-13)

Figure 12. *The center becomes territory.*

Kageyama: 'When things are bad they're completely bad. I couldn't get a good result out of even this local fight.'

Yokoyama: 'But weren't you doing pretty well on the board as a whole to get to play White 12?'

Kageyama: 'If you're going to start comforting me I don't know what to do. Can I resign?'

Yokoyama: 'No, no resignations. You promised to play this game out to the end.'

Kageyama: 'Have pity.'

Still, I did my best to narrow the margin, even if only by a little. If you look at the moves that follow you will see that I was far from being ready to give up.



Figure 13 (1-16)

Figure 13. *Overplay.*

Kageyama: 'If I hadn't played White 1, I couldn't have stood Black *p*. When White 1 forced Black 2, however, I decided to go at least a little way into your big territory with White 3.'

But to my surprise, my opponent started toward the left with 4 and 6. He stopped White 9 with Black 10 and 12, and since I couldn't make any serious inroads there, it seems that after forcing Black 2 with White 1 I should have taken the lead on the left side with White 3 at 8.

Turning my attention elsewhere, I tried an invasion in the upper right at White 13. Black 14 and 16 were typical of Yoko, but if he had defended honestly and not fought back so hard, I don't think I could have done anything much.



Figure 14 (1-50)

⑪ *ko* ⑳ *ko* ㉙ *ko* ㊵ *ko* ㊻ *ko*
⑭ *ko* ㉓ *ko* ㉞ *ko* ㊸ *ko* ㊾ *ko*
⑰ *ko* ㉖ *ko* ㊲ *ko*

Figure 14. *Ko fight.*

Yokoyama: 'It was funny of me to play Black 6 and have you start a ko. Should I have played 6 at *p* and captured the corner?'

Kageyama: 'If you had done that, I would have carried out my option at *q* and rescued the stone marked △.'

Yokoyama: 'That wouldn't have been such a serious matter. Black 6 was odd. Both of us had lots of ko threats, and I didn't know what the outcome would be.'

The ko fight meandered on. Along the way, it pained me to have to answer at White 33.



Figure 15 (1–50)

⑤ *takes ko.* ㉗ *takes ko (next to* ㉔*).* ㉚ *takes ko.*
㉝ *takes ko.* ㊴ *connects at* ㉘*.* ㊱ *takes ko.*

Figure 15. *35-point loss.*

Kageyama: 'The way you persevered at Black 42 in the last figure and on into this figure was enough to make me hate you. I got so fed up that I started another ko with White 23 in the upper left corner, but I did it without much hope for success, and without enough ko threats. I couldn't win.

To lose by only thirty-five points after staging such a tragedy on the right side makes me wonder how it would have ended without that. I don't have any luck.'

Yokoyama: 'Stop making amateurish remarks. Thirty-five points is about average for a three-stone game.'

Subsequent moves omitted. Black wins by 35 points.

SECOND THREE-STONE GAME

White: Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan
Black: Bin Suzuki, 5-dan (amateur)
53 years old. A priest at the Jokoji temple in Shizuoka.



Figure 1 (1–12)

Figure 1. *Amateur against professional*

Yokoyama: 'For White 5, the diagonal play at 7 is the joseki, but that's a hackneyed opening, so I deliberately tried a variation.'

Suzuki: 'Should Black 6 have been the hane at *p*? When I played 6, I wasn't worried about being cut by White 7 at 8, since the ladder was good for me, and I thought this way might be stronger.'

Yokoyama: 'Right you were, Black 6 was good. Your cool defense up to Black 12 left me nothing to gloat over.'

Kageyama: 'If we take a fair view of this exchange, White looks a bit silly. Black got off to an easy start.'



Figure 2 (1-15)

Figure 2. *Full marks.*

Suzuki: 'What about the fighting from Black 2 to 14 in the upper right corner? I thought I was forced to play that way, but—'

Yokoyama: 'Since the ladder was with you, it looks as if you could have cut with Black 8 at 9, but your Black 10 was a good, solid move, so I can't really fault you. Black 12 and 14 were nice moves too, I'd say.'

Kageyama: 'Yes, first the cool way you played in the lower right corner and now the way you played in the upper right corner showed great steadiness in local fighting. You're quite strong. You get full marks for your start in this game.'

Yokoyama: 'I couldn't play White 15 at *p* because of Black *q*, White *r*, Black *s*. What was your answer to White 15?'



Figure 3 (1-13)

Figure 3. *A difficult point.*

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 was your first bad move. You should have plastered yourself against me with Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 1. White 4 and 6 are about how I'd have replied, and the connection at 7 would have meant a nice exchange for you.'

Suzuki: 'Was that how I should have played? During the game I was worried about the profit in the corner so I cut at 1. Then I thought I'd see how you'd respond to Black 7.'



Dia. 1



Figure 4 (1-14)

Figure 4. *Professional thinking and amateur thinking.*

Yokoyama: 'This time I wanted to see how you'd respond, so I played White 1. With Black 2 to 8 you seem to have solidified my thin position on the right side.'

Kageyama: 'You probably thought you were putting up strong resistance with Black 2 and so on, but in the end you lost out by having to go back to Black 8, so you were actually helping White by strengthening him. You should have played Black 2 at *p* so as not to help White that way.'

Suzuki: 'Black 10 gave me the cut at *q* next.'

Yokoyama: 'That wasn't worth much. Black 10 at 13 would have been an ideal extension and pincer attack.'



Figure 5 (1-19)

Figure 5. *Adjusting the response.*

Kageyama: 'I was praising Suzuki's technique in the opening and in local fighting, but seeing White 1 to Black 14 makes me want to take it all back. Those black plays were downright lazy. Instead of Black 6, you had to play Black 1 to 5 in Dia. 2 to make some use of your wall. Being strong means being able to adjust your response to fit the situation.'

Yokoyama: 'After his mistakes on the right side and in the lower left corner, I began to feel that I just might have a chance in this game.'



Dia. 2



Figure 6 (1-16)

Figure 6. *Slack.*

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 in the upper left corner was another funny move. You should have made the hane at 1 and connection at 3 in Dia. 3, and let me have the worthless-looking area on the upper side. After White 4 to 10 you could have invaded at 11 and been doing fine.'



Dia. 3

Suzuki: 'I knew that Black 1 was a little slack, but there was that cut at *p* I had been aiming at. Further on, I should have played Black 7 at 10.'



Figure 7 (1-8)

Figure 7. *Difference in strengths, difference in ideas.*

Suzuki: 'From Black 1 to White 8 I was inching in sente along the sure road to victory. Those plays left you no openings to take advantage of.'

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 to White 8 removed all my weaknesses without my having to lift a finger. You made life easy for me. If you had jumped out with Black 1 at *p*, I might have been in trouble.'

Suzuki: 'I won't say that Black *p* didn't occur to me, but you were the wrong opponent. I was vaguely afraid that what with the difference in our strengths, something dreadful might happen.'

Yokoyama: 'How could a player as strong as you think something like that? Afraid to jump out to *p*—nonsense.'



Reference Figure

Reference Figure.

Yokoyama: 'If I had been Black I'd have jumped out to 1 in no time.'

Kageyama: 'Suzuki thought he was strong enough to sacrifice Black △ and still win the game.

A beginner would think he couldn't afford to lose Black △ and run out to Black 1. The professional's move and the beginner's move often agree, but the reasoning behind them is different, so the beginner falls down in the continuation. A professional would be thinking aggressively, trying to divide White in two and attack. What would be the continuation?'

Yokoyama: 'I'd play White 2 and 4, but Black could escape with 5 and 7. That would be the end of my dreams of territory on the right side. In fact, it would seem to be the end of the game.'



Figure 8 (1-6)

Figure 8. *Amateur thinking.*

Kageyama: 'I understand how Suzuki felt. If I were playing against some strong cutthroat opponent like Otake or Kato, I'd be restrained by fear too.'

Suzuki: 'I imagine so. If even a professional feels that way, then naturally I'd want to be on my guard with an opponent three stones stronger than me, especially a cutthroat like Yokoyama.'

Kageyama: 'But you certainly don't deserve any praise for failing to play where of course you had to play. Being on your guard is fine, but if you're on guard too much—it's the "too much" that's wrong. "Too much" is just as bad as "not enough", you know.'

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 was a good idea. I didn't know what to do with that stone. I just said "Bother!" and tried capping it with White 2, but I didn't really expect that move to work.'

Kageyama: 'Surely you had to defend with White 2 at *p*. What were you planning to do if he played Black *q*, White *r*, Black *p*, instead of Black 3?'

Yokoyama: 'Don't ask embarrassing questions. I already said I didn't expect the move to work.'

Kageyama: 'Even if you didn't expect it to work, you must have had some plan in mind.'

Yokoyama: 'You won't give up, will you. I was planning to play *s* and manage somehow from there.'

Kageyama: 'White nonchalantly says he was going to "manage somehow" and Black says he felt "vaguely afraid". That certainly keeps things in balance.'

Suzuki: 'If I had played Black *q*, White *r*, Black *p* and then got careless and got captured, the game would have been over. "Be careful, be careful," I told myself, and played Black 3 to keep White from expanding in the center.'

Yokoyama: 'Your caution saved me. I felt very relieved when I was able to play White 4.'

Kageyama: 'Black missed a chance to settle the issue with one stone. Ever since the last figure, he's been trying to win safely on territory in the middle game. That's not altogether bad, as some ballad says, but there's the line, "You're lost if you think you're going to win."

Yokoyama: 'I played White 6 to feel out Black's response.'



Figure 9 (1–11)

Figure 9. *Black's strongest move.*

Suzuki: 'I thought I was doing all right when I played Black 1.'

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 was your strongest move. White 2 to 6 were forced. You would have done even better if you had given atari with Black 7 at 8 and played 7 after White *p*.'

Suzuki: 'Perhaps I should have gone ahead and given atari at *q* with Black 9.'

Yokoyama: 'No, Black 9 was correct. White 10 settled the fight in the center, and I got territory but you did too, which was about what to expect, I guess.

Black 11 was a small move. Black *r*, to test my response, would have been better. If I played *s*, Black *t* looks right.'

Suzuki: 'I doubt that I could have thought of Black *t*.'



Figure 10 (1-16)

Figure 10. *Endgame.*

Suzuki: 'I played 1 and 3 as forcing moves in sente, then started the endgame with the hane at 5, but I never dreamed you'd ignore me on the lower side. After being cut at 6, I realized how much it hurt.'

Yokoyama: 'Fighting spirit made me play White 6, but actually Black 9 and 11 were big, too, and I'm not sure myself which of us came out ahead.'

Kageyama: 'Wouldn't a double hane, White 6 at *p*, have been the usual idea?'

Suzuki: 'The cut at 6 suddenly made White's part of the center much bigger. I was in a little bit of a flurry when I played Black 13 and 15, but I had to reduce the white territory in the center somehow.'



Figure 11 (1-26)

Figure 11. *Judging the size.*

Yokoyama: 'Instead of your Black 1, Black 1 in Dia. 4 was simply huge. Even after White 2 to 6, you could play Black *a*, White *b*, Black *c*, or something like that, so I couldn't have gotten as much in the center as I'd have liked.'

Suzuki: 'Judging the size of plays is my weak point. Anyway, I was in a hurry about the center.'

Yokoyama: 'Black 23 was played too early. It was a sin to let me block at White 24 in sente.'



Dia. 4



Figure 12 (1-40)

Figure 12. *Draw.*

Suzuki: 'I thought I was still in the lead when I slid in to Black 1.'

Yokoyama: 'When I stopped you with White 2 to 6 the game was close. Black 11 was no small move—compare it with a white play there—but 16 in the lower left corner, to take away my sente play, was the biggest thing on the board.'

Kageyama: 'Black really got off to a good start in this game, but he tried to win safely on territory in the middle game, which led to his patching up all of White's weak points and brought about a close finish. In most such cases Black tends to lose, but Suzuki was strong enough to hold out for a draw.'

Subsequent moves omitted. Black and White draw.

TWO STONE GAME

Even with this small a handicap, the game remains handicap go, and the approach Black must take to it is the same as before. If he does not intend to attack, he should not sit down at the board.

Try playing through a pro-pro handicap game every day with an unquestioning mind. Eventually, without your being aware of it, the professional feeling will sink in. Try it, even if you don't think it will work.

'The boys in the temple learn the prayers without anyone's teaching them.'

People play go because it is interesting. They play through games because it is fun. Actually, this innocent attitude is a ceaseless well-spring of energy.

Take the long view; your seeds will surely blossom some day. Toward the joy of that moment—

TWO-STONE GAME

White: Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan
Black: Toshiro Kageyama, 6-dan



Figure 1 (1-5)

Figure 1. *A serious affair.*

At two stones, I can no longer relax and expect to beat my opponent by a wide margin. Just one or two mistakes, and there is ample danger that I will have to fight for my life. This makes it a serious affair for both players.

Yokoyama: 'With two stones, it looks as if there's plenty of chance that White may win. Will you mind if I beat you?'

Kageyama: 'It's the same at any handicap, a few white victories just make the game all the more interesting, so feel free to go ahead.'

Yokoyama: 'Thanks, I'll show you my best.'



Figure 2 (1-10)

Figure 2. *Reminiscences.*

Yokoyama: 'When was it that you first became a pro?'

Kageyama: 'The fall of 1949.'

Yokoyama: 'I wasn't a pro yet then, and you were a pro shodan, but you still played black against me. You couldn't beat me, so I gave you two stones, and I beat you a lot even then, as I recall.'

Kageyama: 'That's right, I remember. I kept telling you that there was no reason a person as strong as you shouldn't be a pro. You were really strong in those days.'

Yokoyama: 'No, you were weak. We could never play now the way we did back then.'

Yokoyama: 'Incidentally, I haven't seen much recently of that large knight's move at Black 4 in Figure 1, but you like it, don't you.'

Kageyama: 'It's not that I like it, but almost none of the pros play it, so I'm going to show you that I can win with it—that I can afford it, I mean. I play it a lot in my even games, too.'

Yokoyama: 'Coming to Figure 2, I think I should have held White 2 back one line above where I played it. Of course a capping play at 3 would have been a pretty big next move, but—'

Kageyama: 'I felt that I couldn't afford to allow that capping play, so I had to jump out to Black 3.'

Yokoyama: 'That one-point pincer at Black 5 was one of my sure-fire methods for getting your goat in those four-stone games, but I see my patent's been stolen.'

Kageyama: 'I thought you might say that. I also thought of playing Black 5 at 8. If you extended to *p* I'd play *q*. Or if you extended low, to the point below *p*, I'd play Black *r*, White 5, Black 10, and hold you down.'

Yokoyama: 'That way of playing looks possible. Since you've thought of it, you'll have to try it on me sometime.'

Kageyama: 'White 6 to Black 9 were standard, but White 10—that play doesn't seem possible.'

Problem: Can you tell whether Black should answer with 11 at *A*, *B*, or *C*?



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Yokoyama: 'For White 10 in the figure, White 1 in Dia. 1 is a joseki play—even amateurs know that much—but in this game Black 2 would work with the one-point jump above and make an ideal formation. I didn't like that. It's not interesting to do what the other player has in mind.'

Kageyama: 'Yes, Dia. 1 would certainly have been good for me. How about playing White 1 in Dia. 2 and aiming into my territory from underneath? I'd answer with Black 2 and 4, but with my territory open at the edge, this would be better for you than Dia. 1.'

Yokoyama: 'You can't be so sure about that. The edge is one thing, but Black's stronger in the center in Dia. 2 than in Dia. 1. I actually think that Dia. 2 is better for Black. I'd never stoop to anything as low as White 1 in Dia. 2.'

Kageyama: 'That leaves you without any good moves.'

Yokoyama: 'Well, you had more stones to begin with, so you can't expect miracles. Maybe instead of invading at the three-three point there was some other strategy.'



B



A

B (60%): Black 1 is so bad that it can be banished from the discussion. It lets White jump out easily to 2, and if Black continues with 3 and 5, White can ignore him and play 6.

A (90%): This was the sequence actually played, but it is not entirely safe from the accusation of being slack. White has *a* to aim at a few moves later on.

C (100%): The nastiest way for Black to play is to push through immediately at 1 and cut at 3. Then White has to capture at 4, and Black can get the most out of his stones with 5 to 11.



C



Figure 3 (1-8)

Figure 3. *Probe.*

Yokoyama: 'I was glad to see Black 1 and 3; they struck me as being slack. That connection at White 4 made me feel good.'

Kageyama: 'If you had played White 4 at 1 in Dia. 3, I'd have fixed you with Black 2 to 8; that would've been great.'

Yokoyama: 'I'm not you. That kind of dumb mistake is beyond me.'

But I cut at Black 5, and I wonder if my opponent had all that much to be glad about.

How should Black answer White's probe at 8?

Problem: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



Dia. 3



A

⑭ *throw-in at* ⑥



C

A (50%): Black 1 is bad. Following White 2 and 4, if Black tries to capture White with 5, White's tesujis at 6 and 8 will place him in distress. He will have to capture White's throw-in at 14 by playing at 10, but then White plays *a*, Black connects at 6, White plays *b*, and Black collapses.

C (60%): Aside from the aggravation of having clearly been forced by White, there is bad potential for Black here, and there is no telling what White may do next. Black 1 is not a nice move.

B (100%): Black 1 is a standard resistance measure, and the only correct move here. The sequence from Black 3 to 13 shows that White cannot force his way in at 2.



B



Figure 4 (1-10)

Figure 4. *Taboo.*

Yokoyama: 'To be consistent, I had to descend to 3 with White 2 and wait for you to make the next move. When I played White 2 and you came in at Black 3, the game went sour.'

Kageyama: 'Playing those two beautiful hanes at Black 3 and 5 got me off to a good start. I felt as if I had the game already won. I almost felt sorry for you.'

The sequence in which my opponent lived from 6 to 10 was necessary. Now I had sente, and it seemed that any play would be good enough, but slacking off is taboo.

Problem: Can you tell which among *A*, *B*, and *C* is the correct choice for Black 11?



C (70%): You may feel that Black 1 is good enough, but if you dare to play this defense-only bad move, you deserve a scolding. It puts no pressure on the three white stones.

A (70%): This move puts attacking pressure on White, but it lacks effect toward the right.

B (100%): This knight's move is the right answer. If it were White's turn, he would play 1, too. If you combine that fact with the rule that 'the enemy's key point is your own', Black 1 becomes the only move.



Figure 5 (1–10)

Figure 5. *A principle of economics.*

Yokoyama: 'White 2 and 4 follow a principle of economics: if you make an investment, you should get your money back. I couldn't let that stone go without trying something.'

Kageyama: 'You don't always get your money back when you invest. Lots of people have tried to get their money back, at the horse races, for example, but just gotten in deeper and ended up losing everything. If you try something too unreasonable, this game could be over in the opening.'

Observe the high-handed way Yokoyama played White 8 and 10. Only he would do something like that. All it took to send him recoiling back was a little sure reading.

Problem: Which is best for Black 11: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



C
⑲ *connects*



Reference Diagram
⑫ *connects*

C (70%): Yokoyama: 'That atari at 1 in *C* is a crass move. White'll probe at 4, and if Black resists at 5, White 6 seems to work. After that it's a race to capture, but you can read out that with 24, White wins.'

Kageyama: 'You're expecting too much of Black at 5. He can squeeze you with 5 and so on in the reference diagram, then hold himself to 13, and that's fine for him.'

Yokoyama: 'That may be true, but the main point is that Black 1 is a crass move which Black ought to be criticized for. That's essentially what I want to say.'

Kageyama: 'I agree completely that Black 1 is crass.'

A (60%): Yokoyama: 'Black 1 and 3 here look like the worst moves. Black's trying to save his skin, and as I read it out, up to the ko capture at 21 he wins in a double ko, but that means he can't fight a ko anywhere else on the board, and anyway, it's not good for him to let anything at all questionable happen inside his own territory.'



A



B

Kageyama: 'The fast way you read out those fights in A and C surprised me. Someone like me could never read ahead like that without pausing, or be so sure he had the right answer.'

Yokoyama: 'Say, you're being awfully modest today. If you can't read out something like that instantly, you can't call yourself a pro.'

Kageyama: 'Maybe so, but anyway, a move like Black 1 in C would never enter your mind; you just don't want to play it.'

Yokoyama: 'That sounds more like a pro. That's why sometimes professional blind spots turn up. You know, "How could such a crass move be any good?"'

Kageyama: 'But sometimes the crass move is good.'

B (100%): Yokoyama: 'Black 1 and 3 in B are the correct tesuji. White 4 and so on don't work.'



Figure 6 (1-12)

Figure 6. *Key points.*

Yokoyama: 'You said you couldn't read the sequence out, but there was nothing wrong with the moves you played. I couldn't do anything with you. To have to back up and play White 10 after Black 9 was equivalent to having played no move at all. The only thing that saved my position was that White *p* became an atari. The whole operation was pretty fruitless.'

Next White 12 was a typical key point, putting White △ in an ideal position. As for Black—

Problem: Black must come out at one of the three points *A*, *B*, and *C*, or he will be barricaded by a white stone one point to the right of *A*. Which move should he play?

Kageyama: 'I can't help admiring White 12, even though you played it.'

Yokoyama: 'It wasn't that much of a move, that you should especially admire it.'

Kageyama: 'That's what you say, but doesn't it look as if White could close the corner with 1 in Dia. 4 instead of 12?'

Yokoyama: 'If anyone played that way, I'd say he knew far too little about key points.'



Dia. 4

Kageyama: 'If White played 1 in Dia. 4, then Black would have a beautiful key point to take at 2. That would be his key point. You often hear that the enemy's key point is your own, but that saying doesn't apply to this case. If Black played 2 at 3, which was White's key point, White could fix up his shape with 2; he'd even welcome that exchange.'

Yokoyama: 'Right, you shouldn't depend on go sayings too much, because if the situation is just a little wrong, the opposite thing can be true.

If Black played 2, I guess White 3 to Black 6 would follow. Compared with Black, who has good shape, White has Black 2 sitting on his key point, which is going to cause him no end of trouble, and that makes this sequence very unpleasant for him.'



A



B

A (70%): If Black plays 1, White 2 is obvious. White can make shape with 8, and Black has three stones floating in the center to worry about.

B (80%): Black 1 is quiet—too quiet. If White plays 2 and Black plays 3, for instance, Black will have a hard time with White 4.

C (100%): Black 1 is a good move that creates shortage of liberties, and if White plays 2, Black 3 makes good shape. If White plays 2 at *a*, Black *b* is hard on him.



C



Figure 7 (1-17)

Figure 7. *Shaken up.*

Fighting spirit demanded Black 1, and White 2 was probably an inevitable sequel.

Kageyama: 'When I attacked at the key point with Black 3, I thought you were in a little trouble. White 6 showed the bully in you. The rest of us would have held back to White *p*.'

Yokoyama: 'I had to put some pressure on you to make a game of it, in spite of what you would say, and even if the move was a little unreasonable.'

Kageyama: 'Black 9 must have shaken you up.'

Yokoyama: 'Not in the least. I had even thought of playing White 8 at *q* and cutting deep to keep you from linking up.'

White 14 and 16 were moves that White had not wanted to play, but they covered the weakness of his group in the center.



Figure 8 (1-8)

Figure 8. *Cavalier.*

Yokoyama: 'Black 4 was really conservative—reactionary, in fact. I would never have played a move like that.'

Kageyama: 'I felt like playing it. The reason I played such an ordinary move was that I wanted to just make do with something here and hurry on over to the kakari at Black 8.'

Yokoyama: 'You can't be so cavalier about these local battles. You have to cut at Black 1 in Dia. 5 (next page). Next you should play Black 3. If White 4 to Black 11 follow, your outer wall works perfectly with the stone marked △ in the upper right corner. That gives you a good game.'



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Kageyama: 'I see, that would have given me a thick position on the right side. So Black 3 was the move. It didn't occur to me. I was thinking that if I cut, something like Dia. 6 would happen. Black 3 would take the corner, but White 14 would be a nice move on the right side, and would have an effect on my group in the upper right corner, too. That would be bad for me, and I wouldn't get the chance to play the kakari in the upper left corner.'

Yokoyama: 'So that's why you connected at 4 in the figure. I played White 5 and 7 because I thought the side was more important than the corner. What about them?'

Kageyama: 'I'll have to admit they look pretty good. I guess I let you get away too easily.'

Problem: Should White play 9 at *A*, *B*, or *C*?



⑨ *connects*



C (70%): White will be in trouble if he blocks at 1 and Black plays 2 and 4. White cannot play 5 because of Black 6 to 10. White *a*, Black *b*, White *c*, Black *d*, White *e*, and Black *f* follow, making *g* and *h* miai, and White loses. White 5 at 6, however, would be a disgrace.

A (70%): If White plays 1 he has been forced completely. Black can play 2 to 6 and then light-heartedly turn elsewhere. For that matter, he can turn elsewhere right after White 1.

B (100%): White 1 is the only good move. There is not much else to say about it.



White plays 3 in order to make Black occupy worthless points with 4 and 6. This is not the place for him to play 3 at 6. Many amateurs would think that White should not let Black link up so easily, and would tend to move White 3 to White 6 and take the worthless point themselves. White 3 represents a way of thinking that you should know.



Figure 9 (1–10)

Figure 9. *Aiming to invade.*

Kageyama: 'The reason I carried through with Black 4 and 6 was that I was aiming to invade the upper side at *p*.'

Yokoyama: 'An amateur would defend with White *p* as soon as he thought Black was planning to invade there. That might make White happy himself, but it wouldn't have any effect on Black. Another way to defend is to start trouble in the enemy's camp, as with White 7, and not give him time to invade.'

Kageyama: 'That's right, that fits in with the saying that offense is the best defense. You're pretty sharp today.'

After White 7 to Black 10—

Problem: Would you play White 11 at *A*, *B*, or *C*?



C



B

C (60%): White 1 is bad. Black 2 is a good move. White has to play 7 to stop a black hane. If White crawls out with 9 at 12, Black will probably not answer him at *a*, but attack strongly at *b*. To let Black play 12 in sente, however, is painful. The white group lower down on the right side is growing noticeably weaker.

B (70%): White 1 is one possible move, but here it is wrong. White is aiming at 5 and 7, but look at Black's tesuji at 8. If White plays 13 at *a*, Black 14 leaves the corner in a ko. That cannot be allowed, so White plays 13, but Black can force 14 to 19 in sente, after which he will have no trouble making a decisive invasion of the white position on the upper side.



A

A (100%): The commonsense move at White 1 is the only move for this occasion. White makes his bid to defend the upper side with 7.



Figure 10 (1-9)

Figure 10. *Violence and outrageousness.*

Kageyama: 'Well, for once you've played the regular sequence.'

Yokoyama: 'There's nothing unusual about that; my game is very regular.'

Kageyama: 'Don't make me laugh. You're the only one who thinks that. Everybody who's ever played against you, pro and amateur alike, talks about your violence and outrageousness.'

Yokoyama: 'They're just trying to find some excuse for having lost. Yasunaga even praised my game once as being full of power.'

Problem: Black 10: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A



B

A (70%): If Black pushes at 1, White has strong moves at 2 and 4 that ruin Black's shape.

Kageyama: 'If White played 2 at 6, Black 3 would make a clever shape.'

Yokoyama: 'Yes, but White's not likely to shut his eyes to a strong move like 2. With hanes at both ends of his two stones, Black's position is unplayable.'

B (80%): This 1 is a bit slack. White can get around Black with a knight's move at 2 that combines attack and defense, which is too much to allow.

C (100%): Black 1 is the real move here. White plays 2 just as in the last diagram, but without the same force.

Kageyama: 'Still, White 2 in both B and C is a good move, and I didn't want to have you play it on me.'

Yokoyama: 'Even so, I'd say that B and C are better for Black than A.'



C



Figure 11 (1-10)

Figure 11. *Alarming.*

Kageyama: 'I didn't see how strong White 2 would be against Black 1. I should have been more on my guard, especially since I had a cutthroat opponent like you.'

Yokoyama: 'I could hardly contain myself when I saw Black 1. I thought, "This is great!" and I got all excited and tried to fix you even worse by cutting at 6. That gave me a good forcing atari at 8, so I . . . but all I had to do was hane with White 6 at 7. It's alarming what happens to your mind when you're playing. I threw away that golden opportunity; what a pity.'

Black 7 was a comfortable extension.

Problem: Which is best for Black 11: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A

A (60%): Black 1 and 3 show poor reading. White connects at 4, and Black 5 and 7 on the upper side come to nothing, leaving Black with weak stones to the left and right and a tough time ahead.



B

B (80%): This Black 1, which aims at *a*, is stronger than the one in the last diagram, but will Black *a* really work? Black *a*, White *b*, Black *c*, White *d*, and things will not go as Black wants.



C

C (100%): To cut with Black 1 is the correct answer. Without inserting this cut, Black cannot expect anything attractive.



Figure 12 (1-10)

Figure 12. *Important stones and sacrifice stones.*

A glance shows the confusion on the board. Players who lack confidence in their strength go to pieces in this kind of fight, and meet with disaster. The main reason is that they cannot distinguish between the important stones and the stones that can be sacrificed, and try to save everything.

See how a player as strong as I decided to sacrifice the four stones, (including Black 3), in the center. Turning to the left at Black 7 made that decision clear.

Yokoyama: 'White 6 was too honest. I had to challenge you by pushing with White 6 at 7.'

Problem: Next Black takes aim at the white group on the right side. *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A



C

A (60%): Black 1 traps White △ and takes slow aim at White's group on the right side, but White gives Black no time to go into action. White 2 and 4 stabilize the situation quickly, which means that Black 1 is slack.

C (90%): This capture is a huge move. I almost want to make it the correct answer, but White 2 is annoying to Black in this situation, which detracts from the value of 1. In many other situations, however, it would be correct.

B (100%): I have called this the correct answer. In this situation the strongest course is to bear down and attack White, not giving him a moment to catch his breath.



B



Figure 13 (1-20)

Figure 13. *Strong blow.*

Yokoyama: 'I was stuck when you played Black 1. I couldn't play White 2 at 3, since you would have answered that at 2.'

Kageyama: 'Black 5 and 7 were a little ordinary, but I thought they were a strong blow here.'

Yokoyama: 'Should I have played White 4 at 13?'

It would not have been proper to block White one point to the left when he played 10. I hit Yokoyama, who is strong on attack but weak on defense, with first one body blow and then another.

He came reeling into the center with 20, but with the four black and four white stones facing each other above there, he was in danger.

Problem: Which would give White the most trouble: *A*, *B*, or *C*?



A



C

A (0%): Black 1 accomplishes nothing, except to help the enemy. After White 2, Black has no arrow to shoot next.

C (100%): Yokoyama: 'This attachment at 1 is a tesuji, and it looks as if White can't help playing 2 to 6. If he doesn't play them, Black *a* means the end. When he connects at 8, Black turns on him at 9, and he's stuck.'

B (100%): Yokoyama: 'I couldn't have handled this inside attachment either. White 2 to 6 can't be avoided, but then Black 7 clearly captures the four white stones above.'



B



Figure 14 (1–34)

Figure 14. *Strong attack.*

How I could have gotten so tangled up as to play a 0 per cent move in a situation that was not at all difficult is completely incomprehensible.

Kageyama: 'There goes my clumsiness at tesuji. Just when I relax and think that any move will be good, I make this kind of blunder.'

Yokoyama: 'At least I escaped total destruction.'

Black 9 etc. were a strong attack in the center. I was playing carefully now, determined to learn my lesson and not repeat my failure. White was in difficulties all the way from 10 to 34.

Yokoyama: 'I finally managed to get to play White 34 on the upper side, but even there I couldn't expect much territory.'

PREFACE

Thank you for waiting so patiently. The five-stone to two-stone portion of Kage's guaranteed winning methods for handicap go is complete.

I have placed the emphasis on pro vs. pro handicap games, in which I had the unstinting cooperation of Koichi Yokoyama, 5-dan, my close friend for thirty years. I would like to let the actual game records explain, 'Here is how to win when you have a handicap.' From the post-game commentaries and discussions, I feel certain that you will be able to grasp the essential character of go.

Find-the-next-move-type problems accompany the game records, and seeing how many points you can get should add to the interest. It will also be interesting to see if White manages to win any of these handicap games. When you finish this book and nod in understanding, your playing strength will have taken a great stride forward.

June, 1974 Toshiro Kageyama



Figure 15 (1–35)
⓫ connects

Figure 15. *Posture of attack.*

Yokoyama: 'Black 1 looks like a good move. Even after I played White 4, all my territory caved in. There was just no way for me to take control of the upper side. I thought White 2 was big, but—'

With Black 3 to 15, what had looked like my opponent's territory became five points for me and zero for him. The margin widened and the game was over. There had been no lack of bad moves by both sides during the course of it, and if I had managed to keep a tight hold on the lead, it had only been by maintaining an unbending posture of attack. The attack on the white group on the right side had been particularly fierce, and even though the deciding blow was missed, it assured me of my victory.

Subsequent moves omitted. Black wins by 23 points.